

## Errata

In Chapter 11 ('The Argument from Benefit (169c3–175a8)'), p248, line 29: the transliterated Greek in parenthesis reads '*en ois*'.

The correct text is '*en hois*'.

make them. For since he won't have substantive knowledge of the object of each science,<sup>30</sup> he won't be able to reliably distinguish genuine experts from those that merely play the part. If we glance back to the opening scene of the dialogue, we may be tempted to read this as a joke at Critias' expense. There, Critias thought he was using a ruse when he told Charmides that Socrates was a doctor. But, according to the present argument, he really could not have known whether his claim was false or true. In the sequel of the investigation (170e3–171c10), Socrates slightly changes perspective<sup>31</sup> in order to explain further the implication that, since the temperate person has no access to substantive content,<sup>32</sup> he/she is unable to distinguish in an expert manner between real and fraudulent claims to knowledge.<sup>33</sup>

Let us consider the matter from a different starting point. If the temperate man or anyone else is going to discriminate between the person who is truly a doctor and the one who is not, won't he behave as follows? Surely, he will not discuss with him about medicine – for, as we have said, the doctor has knowledge of nothing other than health and disease. Isn't that so? – It is. – But he knows nothing of science; instead we have assigned that to temperance alone. – Yes. – Therefore, the medical man knows nothing of medicine either, since medicine is in fact a science. – True. – Thus, the temperate man will know that the doctor possesses a certain science. But when he has to test which one it is, will he consider anything other than what things it is a science of? Or is it not the case that each science is defined not merely as a science but also as a particular one,<sup>34</sup> by virtue of this, namely its being of certain specific objects? – Surely it is. – And medicine was defined as being different from the other sciences by virtue of the fact that it was the science of health and disease, right?<sup>35</sup> – Yes. – So, mustn't anyone wishing to enquire into medicine enquire into what domain [*en toutois*] medicine is found in [*en ois*]? For he would presumably not enquire into domains external to these in which it is not found. – Of course not. – Hence it is in the domain of health and disease that the person who enquires in the correct manner will enquire into the doctor *qua* doctor. – It seems so. – Won't he enquire as to whether, in things either thus said or thus done, what is said is said truly and what is done is done correctly? – Necessarily. – Now, could a person pursue either of these lines of enquiry without the art of medicine? – Surely not. – Nor, it

<sup>30</sup> ἐπίστασθαι τι: 170d6 (my emphasis).      <sup>31</sup> σκεψώμεθα δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε: 170e3.

<sup>32</sup> On this point, see the comments by Schofield 1973.

<sup>33</sup> Clearly, Socrates is not concerned with ordinary, haphazard distinctions between experts and charlatans, but rather with the ability to distinguish between these two in an expert, scientific manner.

<sup>34</sup> I change τις, the interrogative printed by Burnet at 171a6, to the indefinite pronoun τις.

<sup>35</sup> I end the Greek sentence at 171a9 with a question mark, where Burnet has a full stop.