

ONLINE APPENDIX – CHAPTER 4

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Part 1: Electoral Autocracies in the Comparative Manifesto Dataset

Table A.4.1.1. Electoral Autocracies in the Comparative Manifesto Dataset

Country	Election Year	Total Number of Party Manifestos
Albania	1991	8
	1992	7
	1996	9
	1997	9
	2001	5
Armenia	1995	5
	1999	6
	2003	6
	2007	5
	2012	6
Azerbaijan	1995	4
	2000	5
Belarus	1995	8
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1996	5
	1998	6
	2000	8
	2002	6
	2006	9
	2010	8
	2014	8
Croatia	1992	11
	1995	10
Georgia	1992	18
	1995	8
	1999	4
	2003	6
	2008	5
Macedonia	1994	6
Moldova	1994	4
Portugal	1975	6
Romania	1990	15
	1992	8
Russia	1993	10
	1995	13
	1999	7
	2003	7
	2007	4
	2011	4
Serbia	1992	8
	1993	11
	1997	7
	2000	3
Turkey	1995	5
	1999	8
	2015	8
Ukraine	2002	6
Mexico	1976	2
	1979	4

Table A.4.1.1. Electoral Autocracies in the Comparative Manifesto Dataset

Mexico (cont.)	1982	4
	1985	6
	1988	3
	1991	6
	1994	4
	1997	5

Part 2: Differences in Campaign Appeal Emphasis in Countries that Experienced Electoral Authoritarian Rule

Unlike the graphs we have seen so far, the bars in Figure A.4.2.1 lack confidence intervals as there are too few observations to estimate them after disaggregating the analysis by country. However, we can still compare whether the patterns of issue emphasis for each of these countries are the same as those we observed in the aggregate analyses.




FIGURE A.4.2.1: DIFFERENCES IN CAMPAIGN APPEAL EMPHASIS IN COUNTRIES THAT EXPERIENCED ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN RULE

Part 3: Analysis of the Electoral Authoritarian Appeal Scale

Results from the Iterative Procedure for Component Selection Validation for Electoral Authoritarian Appeals Scale

To complete Prosser's (2014) scale component validation procedure, I first select correlation thresholds for component inclusion by examining the distribution of the correlations between the initial "naïve" scale and all Manifesto policy items. The histograms of these distributions, evaluated at different stages of the iteration procedure are provided in Figure A.4.3.1 below. The first histogram, evaluated before the start of the iterative procedure, shows a relatively clear separation between two groups of uncorrelated and correlated components at a correlation coefficient value of 0.33, which I use as an initial iteration value. After achieving convergence at the second iteration, I re-evaluate the threshold again – now the breakpoint seems to have shifted a bit to 0.43, so I use this value for the next round of iterations. The procedure then converges immediately after the third iteration; an examination of the distribution of correlations suggests that the breakpoint has not shifted, implying that the process has achieved a stable equilibrium. The components that are above the correlation threshold of 0.43 in the last, third iteration (marked in bold in Table A.4.3.1) therefore represent the new, validated scale of electoral authoritarianism.




FIGURE A.4.3.1: EXOGENOUS CORRELATIONS OF MANIFESTO COMPONENTS AND THE ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE (ABSOLUTE VALUES)

Table A.4.3.1: Correlations of Individual Issue Components with the Electoral Authoritarianism Scale (Correlations in Bold Denote Components Included in the Next Iteration)

Component	Iteration		
	1	2	3
National way of life +	0.66	0.61	0.61
Political authority	0.62	0.60	0.60
Democracy	0.60	0.60	0.60
Freedom & human rights	0.49	0.47	0.47
Constitution +	0.42	0.39	0.39
Environmentalism +	-0.37	-0.31	-0.31
Civic mindedness +	0.27	0.53	0.53
Culture +	-0.22	-0.22	-0.22
Technology & infrastructure	-0.20	-0.24	-0.24
Peace	0.20	0.21	0.21
Traditional morality +	0.19	0.18	0.18
Minority groups	-0.18	-0.18	-0.18
Anti-imperialism	0.18	0.18	0.18
Military +	0.15	0.13	0.13
Political corruption	0.14	0.11	0.11
Anti-growth economy +	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
Internationalism -	0.13	0.11	0.11
Incentives	-0.12	-0.13	-0.13
Multiculturalism +	0.11	0.13	0.13
Foreign special relations -	0.11	0.12	0.12
Marxist analysis +	0.10	0.08	0.08
Market regulation	-0.10	-0.11	-0.11
Education -	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10
Economic growth +	0.10	0.08	0.08
Government administrative efficiency	-0.10	-0.10	-0.10
Traditional morality -	-0.09	-0.11	-0.11
Free market economy	0.08	0.07	0.07
Welfare -	-0.08	-0.07	-0.07
Equality +	0.08	0.12	0.12
Europe -	0.08	0.05	0.05
Welfare +	-0.08	-0.10	-0.10
Education +	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07
Economic planning	-0.07	-0.04	-0.04
Controlled economy	0.07	0.09	0.09
Keynesian demand management	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08
Middle class and professional groups	0.07	0.08	0.08

Table A.4.3.1: Correlations of Individual Issue Components with the Electoral Authoritarianism Scale (Correlations in Bold Denote Components Included in the Next Iteration)

Component	Iteration		
	1	2	3
Constitution -	0.07	0.04	0.04
Corporatism mixed economy	-0.07	-0.05	-0.05
Decentralization	-0.07	-0.06	-0.06
Protectionism -	0.06	0.05	0.05
National way of life -	0.05	0.06	0.06
Non-economic demographic groups	-0.05	-0.04	-0.04
Law and order +	0.05	0.02	0.02
Europe +	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02
Agriculture +	-0.05	-0.08	-0.08
Economic orthodoxy	-0.04	-0.07	-0.07
Centralization	0.04	0.02	0.02
Multiculturalism -	0.03	0.01	0.01
Protectionism +	0.03	-0.02	-0.02
Military -	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
Internationalism +	0.02	0.01	0.01
Foreign special relations +	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
Labor groups -	0.02	0.03	0.03
Labor groups +	0.02	0.03	0.03
Nationalization	0.02	0.02	0.02
Economic goals	0.00	-0.02	-0.02




FIGURE A.4.3.2: COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM SCALE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN EMPHASIS SCALE OF BAKKER AND HOBOLT (2013)

Part 4: Variables Used in the External Validity Test of the Scale of Electoral Authoritarian Appeals

Table A.4.4.1: Variable Description and Sources		
Variable	Source	Downloaded from
Regime indicators Number of years since a given country has gained independence	Authoritarian Regimes Dataset (ver. 6.0) (see Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013))	https://sites.google.com/site/authoritarianregimesdataset/
Per capita income indicator (expressed in constant 2005 international dollars)	Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) comprehensive GDP per capita series (see James et al. (2012))	http://www.healthdata.org/research-article/developing-comprehensive-time-series-gdp-capita-210-countries-1950-2015
Indicators for high-intensity (>1000 battle death) and low- and high-intensity (>25 battle deaths) conflicts	UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (see Gleditsch and Choung (2008))	www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict
Total Value of Oil and Gas Production (production volume times world price for oil, expressed in constant 2000 international dollars)	Oil and Gas Dataset (Ross and Mahdavi 2015),	https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/ZTPW0Y
Military personnel per thousand inhabitants	National Material Capabilities Dataset of the Correlates of War Project (v.5.0) (see Singer (1988) and Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972))	www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities
The proportion autocracies sharing a land or river border with a country	Constructed using regime data from the Authoritarian Regimes Dataset and the Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Dataset (v.3.2) (see Stinnett et al. (2002))	Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Dataset (v.3.1) downloaded from http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/direct-contiguity
Type of political system variable (denoting Presidential, Parliamentary and Assembly-elected President systems)	Database of Political Institutions 2015 (updated Jan. 2013) (see Thorsten et al. (2001))	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/wps2283-database-political-institutions
Cold War Dummy (marking period 1973-1989)		

Table A.4.4.2: Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the External Validity Test of the Scale of Electoral Authoritarian Appeals

Variable	Number of Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Electoral authoritarianism scale	3030	.86	.47	0	3.1
Conflict with >1000 casualties in the past 3 years	3022	.046	.31	0	3
Conflict with >25 casualties in the past 3 years	3022	.35	.87	0	3
Log Per Capita Income	3022	9.7	.68	7.2	11
Log Military Size	2824	1.9	.67	0	3.9
Post-Cold War Period Dummy	3022	.76	.43	0	1
Log Value of Oil and Gas Production	2995	15	9.1	0	27
Assembly-elected President	2919	.051	.22	0	1
Parliamentary System	2919	.77	.42	0	1
Years Since Independence	3022	138	112	-3	314
% Authoritarian Neighbors	3016	34	37	0	100

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