ONLINE APPENDIX – CHAPTER 5

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PART 1: Why People Trust Vladimir Putin – Extended Analysis

In responding that people trust Vladimir Putin because they hope he will bring improvements in the future or because there were no other alternatives, ordinary Russians did not simply rationalize the behavior of their compatriots, with whom they did not necessarily agree. Instead, they seemed to project their own reasons for supporting Putin. We see evidence of this if we examine only the responses of Russians who themselves had positive appraisals of Putin. Looking at the 2000-2013 period (for which data for cross-tabulations is available), an average of only about 27 percent of Levada Center survey respondents who approved of Vladimir Putin's performance said he was trusted because he successfully tackled Russia's problems. In turn, 41 percent on average said that people trusted him because they hoped he will do so in the future, and 29 percent of those approving his performance said Putin is trusted because people see no better alternatives. In other words, 70 percent of Russians who approved Putin's performance, said that he is trusted because of the hope he inspired or the lack of better alternatives.

This logic of delayed and suspended accountability raises a crucial question: did it allow Putin to maintain support among dissatisfied citizens, who might have voted him out of office in different circumstances? To examine this, I estimate multinomial logit models of responses to the question why people trust Putin using data from the 15 available Levada Center surveys that contain it. These models account for the effects of the respondent characteristics like age, gender, social class, education and size of the settlement where respondents live, as well as two key politically-relevant outlooks – beliefs that things in Russia are going in the right direction, and the respondents' party sympathies.

In Figure A.1 below, I depict the estimated effects of these variables on the odds of a response other than the baseline category "people trust Putin because they believe he successfully and adequately tackles Russia's problems." The left panel in the graph covers all 15 surveys that contain this question in the 2001-2014 period, and the one to the right includes estimates using surveys only for 2001-2007, which also contain data on the respondents' party sympathies. The top part of each of these panels displays the estimated odds of choosing the "people trust Putin because they hope he will tackle Russia's problems in the future" response as opposed to the baseline category. The

bottom part shows the relative odds of choosing the "people trust Putin because they see no one else they can depend on" response. The odds are shown with 95 percent confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors. Point estimates above 1 suggest that increases in the given variable correlate with an increase in the odds of the choice in question relative to the baseline category. The opposite is true for odds ratios estimates below 1.

If people's hopes about Putin's leadership and their perceived lack of better alternatives did indeed help him maintain the support of dissatisfied Russians, beliefs that things in Russia are going in a bad direction should significantly *increase* the odds of choosing these reasons for why people trust Putin. In other words, respondents with negative assessments of the general circumstances in Russia should be more likely to rationalize trust in Putin in terms of future hopes and lack of alternatives, even as they find his actual achievements lacking.


Note: odds ratios with 95% confidence intervals

Figure A.1: Odds of Choosing a Response Other than "People Trust Putin Because He Adequately Tackles the Problems of Russia"

The estimates shown in Figure A.1 strongly support these claims. The perception that things in Russia are going in a bad direction is the strongest predictor of responses that Putin is trusted due to hopes or lack of alternatives, rather than actual achievements. This effect holds both for the model covering the entire 2001-2014 period in the left panel of Figure A.1 and in the model for 2001-2007 in the right panel, which includes controls for party sympathies. Indeed, it is striking that negative assessments of Russia's direction have an effect just as great as sympathies for the major oppositional parties. Thus, according to the estimates in the right panel of Table A.1, bad evaluations of Russia's general direction increase the odds that respondents will ascribe Putin's popularity to hope or lack of alternatives by more than 1.5 and 2.5 times, respectively – just as much as the difference between sympathizing the main opposition parties instead of the pro-regime ones. This suggests indicate that hope in Putin's leadership and the perceived lack of alternatives – sentiments stemming from the trauma of Russia's post-Communist crisis – allowed Putin not only to maintain the support of Russia's generally dissatisfied majority, but to also of citizens with pro-oppositional outlooks. And as I show in Figure A.2 below, negative appraisals of Russia's general direction are the best predictor of beliefs that Putin is trusted because of hope and fear even among respondents who approve Putin's performance in office, though the effect is somewhat smaller. Once again, this indicates that the estimates in Figure A.1 largely reflect people's own reasons for trusting Putin, which they have "projected" onto other Russians.

The behavior of the other variables with significant effects in the models displayed in Figures A.1 and A.2 is in line with these conclusions. In particular, low social class significantly increases the odds that a respondent would say that people trust Putin because of hope and lack of other choices, rather than because of his actual achievements. The same is true for respondents with higher education – particularly college-educated individuals – and for middle aged individuals. I depict the latter effect, captured by the significant squared age term, in Figure A.3. These graphs suggest that the probability of responding that people trust Putin because of his achievements declines by up to one third for respondents around the age of 50, when all other variables are held at their means. The likelihood of the "hope" and particularly the "no alternative" responses for this age group increase correspondingly.

Taken together, these results indicate that the poorer, the more highly educated and middle-aged Russians, the dissatisfied with Russia's direction, and the sympathizers of opposition parties, were significantly more likely to justify trust in Putin in terms of hope and lack of alternatives rather than

his actual performance. For this diverse group, jointly making up to two thirds of Putin's support, hope and fear of alternatives were the psychological mechanisms that enabled what Rose, Mishler, and Munro (2004) called the "resigned acceptance" of Putinist autocracy. When the system performed well, they supported its leader. When the system performed badly, they were still willing to support Putin, however reluctantly, as the recent trauma of Russia's post-Communist decline has taught them there is little else to hope for and much to fear from change. The bulk of Putin's support, in other words, was not driven by a "what have you done for me lately?" economic voting logic, as in stable democracies. Instead, it became captive to a "would all hope be lost and would things become worse without Putin?" outlook.

Figure A.2: Odds of Choosing a Response Other than "People Trust Putin Because He Adequately Tackles the Problems of Russia" (Respondents that Approve Putin's Performance vs. All Respondents)

Table A.1: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Responses About Why People Trust Putin ("People Trust Putin Because He Adequately Tackles Russia's Problems" Response as Base Category)

	2001-2014			2001-2007		
	Hope he will tackle in the future	No alternative	Don't know	Hope he will tackle in the future	No alternative	Don't know
Age (std.)	0.05 (0.05)	0.19 (0.05)**	0.17 (0.09)*	-0.02 (0.07)	0.25 (0.07)**	0.23 (0.17)
Age squared (std.)	-0.52 (0.08)**	-0.67 (0.09)**	-0.15 (0.16)	-0.49 (0.12)**	-0.56 (0.12)**	-0.46 (0.27)+
Male	0.03 (0.04)	0.15 (0.04)**	0.38 (0.08)**	0.03 (0.06)	0.14 (0.06)*	0.36 (0.14)*
Education: high school	0.18 (0.06)**	0.20 (0.07)**	-0.10 (0.12)	0.18 (0.08)*	0.26 (0.09)**	-0.22 (0.18)
Education: college	0.16 (0.08)*	0.36 (0.08)**	0.07 (0.14)	0.30 (0.11)**	0.45 (0.11)**	-0.03 (0.24)
Larger settlement (std.)	-0.08 (0.04)+	0.11 (0.04)*	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.17 (0.06)**	0.06 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.15)
Lower class	0.32 (0.07)**	0.40 (0.07)**	0.45 (0.13)**	0.29 (0.10)**	0.32 (0.10)**	0.38 (0.25)
Middle class	0.17 (0.06)**	0.23 (0.06)**	0.14 (0.12)	0.12 (0.09)	0.13 (0.10)	-0.05 (0.25)
Direction of Russia bad	0.67 (0.05)**	1.21 (0.05)**	1.34 (0.08)**	0.55 (0.07)**	0.95 (0.07)**	1.03 (0.14)**
Communist sympathizer				0.65 (0.12)**	0.89 (0.12)**	2.42 (0.34)**
Democrat sympathizer				0.27 (0.10)**	0.34 (0.11)**	0.64 (0.41)
Nationalist sympathizer				0.56 (0.18)**	0.98 (0.18)**	2.16 (0.43)**
Sympathizer of other centrist party				0.09 (0.27)	0.49 (0.27)+	1.30 (0.70)+
Sympathizer of other party				0.20 (0.24)	0.88 (0.23)**	0.16 (1.06)
No party sympathy				0.56 (0.08)**	0.92 (0.09)**	1.78 (0.33)**
Constant	-0.41 (0.12)**	-1.10 (0.13)**	-3.13 (0.27)**	-0.79 (0.15)**	-1.23 (0.16)**	-4.22 (0.45)**
Survey fixed effects		YES			YES	
Observations		16306			7965	
Log-likelihood		-19212.8			-9030.3	

Note: Logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

PART 2: Description of the Levada Center Polls Used in the Dimensional Analysis of Russian Popular Opinion

1. Survey Description

The analysis in this chapter uses 116 "Monitoring" and 291 "Courier" and 11 "Fakt" omnibus surveys, all conducted by the Levada Center (Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research – VCIOM until 2003) in the period between 1993 and 2011.[1] The key advantage of these three sets of surveys is that they offer public opinion data disaggregated beyond the annual level, and employ a comprehensive battery of 80-120 questions which have been consistently asked in the same format since 1993. Given the large number of time points for which observations are available, these polls allow for a highly disaggregated study of public opinion trends in post-Soviet Russia.

The second crucial advantage of these surveys is the rigorous and objective fashion in which they have been carried out by the Levada center – standards that are relatively rare for polls conducted in electoral autocracies, especially on this scale. Because of the quality and impartiality of its research, the Levada Center has been regularly used as a primary source of Russian public opinion data by domestic and foreign investigators. Founded by the renowned Soviet sociologist and dissident Yuri Levada in 1988, during the period of liberalization under Gorbachev, the center has maintained a strong reputation for objectivity and reliability both in Russia and the West. The Center's impeccable credentials for political independence and professionalism have also been confirmed by its frequent confrontations with the Kremlin,

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[1] For additional details of the Levada Center history and survey methodology, see http://www.levada.ru/eng.

particularly after Putin's ascendance. In 2003, this resulted with an attempted state takeover and a breakup of the center. After the 2011-2012 protest wave in Russia, the Levada center has been pushed under a new repressive law against NGOs to register as a "foreign agent" because of its overseas funding, in another attempt by the regime to force its closure.[2]

Turning to the methodology of the Levada center surveys used in this study, the "Monitoring" polls are bimonthly omnibus type face-to-face surveys, based on a representative nationwide multi-stage stratified sample of about 2100 residents of age 16 and older. Interviews for the "Monitoring" surveys were typically competed in the second or third ten-day interval in the months of January, March, July, September and November. The "Courier" surveys, in turn, are monthly omnibus face-to-face surveys, based on a representative nationwide multi-stage stratified sample of about 1600 respondents aged 18 years and older. Interviews for the "Courier" surveys were usually conducted between the 10th and 20th day of every month. The samples were drawn from 200-240 sampling units for the "Monitoring" surveys, and about 130 sampling units for the "Courier" surveys.

For both the "Monitoring" and "Courier" surveys, household selection was done using a random route method, and individual respondents within a household are selected using the nearest birthday method. All interviews are conducted by local interviewers, trained by the Levada Moscow office, and regularly employed for these surveys. The interviewers visit each selected household/respondent up to 3 times in different days of a week to complete the interview. Field control of the interviewers work is conducted in two stages. First, regional supervisors control around 20 percent of the interviews by phone or repeated visits. Second, at least 10 percent of the interviews for the "Monitoring" and "Courier" surveys are verified directly by the Levada Moscow office by phone or by post spot check. The data for these surveys

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[2] Treisman, D. (2013). Why the Kremlin Hates Levada Center . *The Moscow Times*.

are weighted by gender, age, education, region, and settlement size, in accordance to census data, as well as by political preferences in periods around elections. The average response rate for these surveys was about 68 percent (range 54-83 percent). Based on the sampling design, the survey error in these polls is 3-3.5 percent.

The 11 "Fakt" surveys used in this chapter are monthly polls conducted in 1993 and have a similar design as the "Courier" polls. This study also uses 19 New Russia Barometer (NRB) annual surveys for 1993-2009, conducted by the Levada Center for the University of Strathclyde in the UK. These surveys are based on a nationwide sample of 1600-2000 respondents and also follow a similar methodology as the "Courier" polls.[3]

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[3] See www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/NRBsamples.html for a detailed description of the design of each of the New Russia Barometer surveys.

2. Wording of the Survey Items Used in the Dimensional Analyses[1]

PRIMARY CONCERNS CLUSTER

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING PROBLEMS OF OUR SOCIETY YOU ARE MOST CONCERNED WITH AND CONSIDER THE MOST SERIOUS ONES:

- *Shortages* (N=35)
- *Poverty, impoverishment of the majority of the population* (N=17)
- *Rising prices* (N=52)
- *Rise in unemployment* (N=52)
- *The crisis in the economy, the production slump in the industry and agriculture* (N=51)
- *The increasing number of criminal offenses* (N=52)
- *The crisis in culture, morality* (N=52)
- *The Environmental degradation* (N=52)
- *The rise of nationalism, deterioration of interethnic relations* (N=50)
- *Inaccessibility of many kinds of medical care* (N=16)
- *Growth of drug addiction* (N=17)
- *Drastic stratification of rich and poor, unjust distribution of incomes* (N=40)
- *Growth in payments for education, inaccessibility of education* (N=17)
- *Restriction of civil rights, democratic freedoms (freedom of speech, media freedom)* (N=16)
- *The threat of fascism and extremism* (N=24)
- *Corruption, bribery* (N=52)
- *Weakness of state authority* (N=52)
- *Conflicts between different branches of government on various levels* (N=51)
- *The threat of military dictatorship* (N=27)
- *Delays in payment of wages, pensions, allowances, etc.* (N=34)
- *Threat of bombings and other terrorist acts in the areas where you live* (N=19)

INSTITUTIONAL TRUST CLUSTER

To what extent, in your opinion, the President of Russia is trustworthy? (N=33)

To what extent, in your opinion, the State Duma (Parliament) is trustworthy? (N=33)

To what extent, in your opinion, the Russian Government is trustworthy? (N=33)

To what extent, in your opinion, Republican Authorities are trustworthy? (N=33)

To what extent, in your opinion, Municipal Authorities are trustworthy? (N=33)

To what extent, in your opinion, the Army is trustworthy? (N=33)

To what extent, in your opinion, State Security Services are trustworthy? (N=33)

To what extent, in your opinion, the police is trustworthy? (N=16)

To what extent, in your opinion, Unions are trustworthy? (N=33)

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[1] For each item, the number of different time periods for which data were available and used for the dyad ratios analysis is given in parentheses.

To what extent, in your opinion, the Church and religious organizations are trustworthy? (N=33)

To what extent, in your opinion, the press, radio and television are trustworthy? (N=33)

To what extent, in your opinion, Parties are trustworthy? (N=24)

To what extent, in your opinion, Courts are trustworthy? (N=15)

CURRENT ASSESSMENTS CLUSTER

Do you think that Russia is developing in a right direction or is our country going in the wrong direction? (N=151)

How would you assess Russia's present economic situation? (N=110)

How would you assess the economic situation in your city/rural area? (N=109)

How would you rate the situation with payment of wages, pensions, scholarships, in your city/region: it's becoming better, worse, or you notice no changes? (N=97)

How would you evaluate in general the political situation in Russia? (N=110)

How would you assess the current situation in the North Caucasus? (N=40)

What do you think,will the sutuation in the Norhtern Caucasus will improve, worsen, or stay the same in the course of the next year? (N=42)

What do you think is happening in Chechnya right now – the war continues or a peaceful life is being established? (N=52)

Do you fear that you or your loved ones may become victims of a terrorist attack? (N=21)

What would you say about your mood in recent days? (N=110)

Which of the following statements is most relevant to the current situation: things are not so bad, life is hard but bearable, living under these conditions is unbearable (N=110)

Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with the life you are currently living? (N=108)

How would you assess your family's present material condition? (N=109)

In your opinion, how did your family income change in relation to prices in the past month? (N=83)

If we talk about large domestic purchases (such as buying furniture, a refrigerator, consumer electronics, TV), do you think that in general now is a good time to make such procurements?

Generally speaking, do you feel confident in the future? (N=40)

Do you think we are currently going through the most difficult times, or they are already behind, or yet to come? (N=43)

Do you think that in the course of the coming year our life will become somewhat better, or that no improvement will happen? (N=83)

What do you think Russia can expect in the economy in the coming several months? (N=99)

What do you think Russia can expect in politics in the coming several months? (N=99)

Do you think that in the next six months Russia's position on the world stage will improve, worsen or remain about the same as now? (N=34)

Do you think that in the next six months, the national economic situation will improve in comparison with the present? (N=35)

And do you think that the quality of your life for the next six months, compared with the current situation, will improve, worsen, or stay about the same as now? (N=36)

Do you think that your own financial situation in the next six months, compared with the present, will be better, worse, or stay about the same? (N=36)

Do you think the next 12 months will be good or bad for the economy of the country? (N=65)

Do you think the next 5 years will be good or bad for the economy of the country? (N=63)

Do you think that in the next 12 months the number of unemployed (i.e. people without a job who are searching for it) will grow? (N=65)

For the last year, your life, and the life of your family has become better, worse or no changes occurred? (N=42)

And in a year from now, do you think that you (your family) will live better or worse than now? (N=55)

Speaking generally about the country, do you think that in a year, life in Russia will be far better, somewhat better, same as now, somewhat worse or much worse? (N=42)

To what extent are you satisfied with what is now taking place in the country as a whole? (N=36)

To what extent are you satisfied with what is happening now in the country in terms of ethics and morality? (N=36)

How satisfied are you with the current economic course of the country's leadership? (N=36)

Speaking about the Government's economic policies, such as the measures it has taken to combat inflation, unemployment and so on, how do you think the government has been dealing with these tasks? (N=60)

Do you think that the present Government of Russia is able to improve the situation in the country in the next year? (N=45)

Do you think that the present Government of Russia is able to deliver change to the better for the country in the near future? (N=116)

What do you think, how big of a role does the President currently play in Russia (rate from 1 to 5)? (N=18)

What do you think, how big of a role the media currently plays in Russia (rate from 1 to 5)? (N=26)

What do you think, how big of a role the political parties currently play in Russia (rate from 1 to 5)? (N=18)

What do you think, how big of a role the unions currently play in Russia (rate from 1 to 5)? (N=26)

What do you think, how big of a role the oligarchs, bankers and financiers currently play in Russia (rate from 1 to 5)? (N=21)

What do you think, how big of a role the regional governors currently play in Russia (rate from 1 to 5)? (N=18)

What do you think, how big of a role the armed forces currently play in Russia? (rate from 1 to 5) (N=26)

What do you think, how big of a role Churches and religious institutions currently play in Russia (rate from 1 to 5)? (N=26)

What do you think, how big of a role do directors of large industrial enterprises and associations currently play in Russia (rate from 1 to 5)? (N=26)

POLICY ATTITUDES CLUSTER

In your opinion, what are the 3-4 activities of the Government from those listed below that you would consider to be the most important at this time?

- *Deepening of the course of reforms, strengthening of the position of private capital* (N=27)
- *Orientation on social protection when carrying out reforms in the country* (N=27)
- *Returning to the state control of the economy* (N=27)
- *Continuation of privatization, the transfer of land to private ownership* (N=27)
- *Revising of the privatization of large state enterprises* (N=27)
- *Improving tax collection* (N=27)
- *Reducing the tax burden of the population and companies* (N=27)
- *Increasing industrial production* (N=27)
- *Closing unprofitable, loss-making enterprises* (N=27)
- *Government support of the core sectors of the economy* (N=27)
- *Reducing the influence of monopolies and the new financial and industrial groups on life the country* (N=27)
- *Liquidation of wage and pension arrears* (N=27)
- *Stimulation of private enterprise, loans to rising entrepreneurs* (N=27)

On what tasks, in your opinion, should the activities of the Government be primarily focused? Select the three tasks that are in your opinion most important.

- *Reducing prices* (N=17)
- *Imposing price controls* (N=17)
- *Increasing the availability of consumer goods* (N=15)
- *Increasing the value of the national currency* (N=17)
- *Increasing tax collection* (N=17)
- *Ensuring payment of late payments of wages, pensions and scholarships* (N=17)
- *Indexing wages, pensions, contributions in accordance with inflation* (N=17)
- *Supporting the banking system, guaranteeing deposits* (N=16)
- *Guaranteeing private sector development* (N=17)
- *Financially supporting state-owned enterprises* (N=15)
- *Financially supporting agriculture* (N=16)
- *Returning enterprises in key economic sectors to state ownership* (N=17)
- *Fighting corruption and embezzlement of state property* (N=16)
- *Maintaining peace and accord in the country* (N=16)
- *Strengthening of law and order, fighting crime* (N=16)

Do you think that now market reforms should continue or that they should cease? (N=80)

What do you think is currently more needed in Russia: order or democracy? (N=17)

What is your attitude to the changes occurring now in the country? (N=35)

Have you and your family already adapted to the changes that happened in the country during the last ten years? (N=80)

Do you think that the majority of Russian citizens has adapted to changes that occurred in the country [since the collapse of Communism]? (N=26)

People organize their lives differently, adapting to its conditions to varying degrees. Which of the following statements best describes your attitude towards life at present?

- *I got used to the fact that one needs to abandon the traditional way of life to survive, limiting oneself on issues both large and small (N=56)*
- *I have to 'scramble', seize every opportunity to make money, just to secure a tolerable life for myself and my family (N=56)*
- *I was able to use the emerging opportunities to achieve more in life (N=56)*
- *I live as before - for me, nothing much has changed in recent years (N=56)*

Which type of economic system do you think is more adequate, the one that is based on state planning and redistribution, or the one which is based on private property and market relations (N=29)

People say that it would be better if everything in the country has remained as it was before the "Perestroika" (before 1985). Do you agree with this? (N=19)

Which political system do you think is better:

- *the Soviet (the one that we had until the 90s)* (N=18)
- *the current system* (N=18)
- *democracy according to the Western model?* (N=18)
- *other* (N=18)

Do you think that Russia currently needs to strengthen mutually beneficial relations with the West, or conversely, to distance itself from the West? (N=18)

Which of the following do you think is more consistent with the Interests of Russia: Russia's accession in NATO, establishing cooperation with NATO, a military alliance with former socialist states and USSR republics to oppose NATO, or not joining any military alliances? (N=15)

What is your general attitude towards the United States at this time? (N=97)

What is your general attitude towards the European Union at this time? (N=54)

What do you think is the future of CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)? (N=21)

What is your general attitude towards Ukraine at this time? (N=63)

What is your general attitude towards Gerogia at this time? (N=27)

Do you consider that it is necessary to continue military action in Chechnya or begin peaceful negotiations with the "fighters?" (N=84)

How would you react to the possibility of secession of Chechnya from Russia? (N=18)

How do you feel about the idea "Russia for Russians?" (N=15)

ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION CLUSTER

In your opinion, how likely at this time are protests in your city/rural area against price increases and decline of living standards? (N=108)

If such protests take place, would you personally take part in them or not? (N=109)

In your opinion, how likely at this time are protests (demonstrations, rallies, strikes) with political demands in your city/rural area? (N=80)

Would you personally support protests demanding the resignation of the President? (N=24)

Would you personally support protests demanding the resignation of the Government? (N=24)

Would you personally support protests demanding The Dissolution of the State Duma? (N=24)

Would you personally support protests demanding the resignation of the Heads of the local administration? (N=22)

If elections for the Duma are held next Sunday, which of the following most accurately reflects your intention to vote in these elections? (N=48)

If elections for President of Russia are held next Sunday, which of the following most accurately reflects your intention to vote in these elections? (N=47)

3. Variable Selection and Coding Rules for the Dimensional Analyses

Following Stimson (1999), the dimensional analyses in this chapter only include items that have been asked in identical form in at least 15 monthly surveys, in order to achieve reliable estimates using the dyad ratios algorithm. However, due to the large number of cross-sectional surveys available, very few questions were dropped from the analysis due to this criterion.

The coding formula I employ for generating the aggregate opinion series for each survey item j is $X_{j,positive} = \frac{\%Positive\ Responses}{\%Positive\ Responses + \%Negative\ Reponses} \times 100$. This approach leaves out neutral responses and non-responses from the calculations, as they have no meaningful directionality in terms of the underlying dimension. To check whether this might introduce biases, I performed a range of auxiliary analyses that include neutral and non-responses. The results (available on demand) are practically the same with those estimated with the procedure above.

PART 3: Was the Regime Support Dimension in Russia Driven by Propaganda?

1. Analysis of the Content of the Regime Support Dimension for the Yeltsin and Putin/Medvedev Presidencies

To which extent did opinions of Russian citizens in the ostensibly more democratic Yeltsin era differ from the period of authoritarian consolidation during the Putin/Medvedev presidencies? In particular, were popular attitudes about politics after Putin's ascendance in 2000 driven by the Kremlin's ever more powerful propaganda machine? If this was the case, the findings of the chapter would, in fact, reflect the results of a giant brainwashing operation, rather than genuine beliefs of Russian citizens.

There is one straightforward way to test this. Russia's electoral autocracy was incrementally established by president Boris Yeltsin through a series of actions aimed to give him some control over the country's unmanageable crises in the 1990s. But while Yeltsin was able to cling to power with these machinations, his control over the country – and the media in particular – was tenuous at best. As result, the Kremlin simply could not substantially mold popular opinion by any stretch of imagination during Yeltsin's reign.[5] This changed after Putin's ascendance. The Kremlin quickly put the "commanding heights" of the media landscape under its control in the early 2000s, and implemented a sophisticated strategy to ensure favorable coverage of the regime.[6]

Russia therefore provides something akin to a natural experiment about the impact of regime media control and propaganda. To the extent that propaganda shaped core popular attitudes in Russia, there should be notable differences in key attitudes and the overall structure

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[5] Burrett, T. (2011). *Television and Presidential Power in Putin's Russia*. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge.

[6] Gehlbach, S. (2010). Reflections on Putin and the Media. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, *26*(1), 77–87.

of popular opinion across the Yeltsin and the Putin/Medvedev eras. From the standpoint of this chapter's analysis, we should observe a different pattern of loadings on the primary regime support dimension of Russian opinion for these two periods if propaganda had a strong influence. Russians should, in other words, support their regime for different reasons during the Yeltsin and Putin/Medvedev presidencies.

In particular, if regime propaganda had a major impact on these attitudes, a few possible discrepancies might emerge across these two periods, depending on the frames employed by the regime's propagandists. First, popular concerns and demands for stability might be strongly associated with regime support only during the crisis years of the Yeltsin presidency, with their salience diminishing after 1999, as Putinist propaganda hyped the achievements of the stabilization under his reign. Second, crisis-centered outlooks could be, conversely, more closely related to popular support for Russia's regime not in the 1990s but in the 2000s, as Putin's regime, aided by its media dominance, justified its rule on the premise that it effectively addressed Russia's post-Soviet crisis. In this case, the relationship between regime support and crisis-centered outlooks might even become reversed: people could *increase* their support for the regime if they see conditions as deteriorating, and become fearful they might face yet another crisis. This would be a logical consequence of the core legitimizing argument of Russia's electoral autocracy: that the best response to instability is to unite in support of the regime, which is best equipped to address it with its strong-armed policies. If this is the prevalent effect of Kremlin's propaganda, and it has a meaningful effect, rising perceptions of instability will prompt a rally-behind-the-flag response. Put differently, rising popular concerns and assessments that things are getting worse will strongly correlate with increases in regime support.

To test these propositions, I use the dyad ratios algorithm to estimate the primary regime support dimension separately for the Yeltsin and for the Putin/Medvedev eras. As this approach relies on splitting the survey series, the separate estimates are based on fewer observations and a

smaller number of survey items.[7] But despite the substantial data loss, they closely match the estimates obtained from the combined series presented in Figure 5.5 of the chapter. Indeed, the correlation between the separate and combined periods estimates is about 0.9, while the mean difference in their aggregate levels is only 1.7 on the 0-100 percent scale of regime support.

But was the primary regime support dimension of Russian opinion driven by the different considerations during the Yeltsin and the Putin/Medvedev presidencies? We can verify this by exploring its content across the two periods, displayed in Table A.3.1 below.[8] Although these separate estimates are noisier, as they are obtained from fewer observations, the item loadings for the two periods follow a similar substantive pattern. In particular, concerns related to stability and performance assessments have aligned most closely with the regime support dimension in both periods. Relatively few items with loadings above 0.6 in these clusters diminish in size or change signs across these periods. Those that do, reflect the changing nature of the problems faced by the people, rather than a change in their overarching crisis-centric outlooks. For instance, concerns about rising prices had a high negative loading only in the first period as inflation was a major problem in the Yeltsin era and less so after Putin's rise. Similarly, short-term prospective evaluations of the political and economic situation had a higher association with regime support throughout the 1990s, as the country was undergoing through a period of acute crisis. After the stabilization in the 2000s, assessments of current circumstances achieved greater loadings, as people's preoccupations turned to recovery.

In sum, despite these shifts in emphasis, the pattern of loadings of items in the primary concerns and evaluations clusters suggests that the regime support dimension across the Yeltsin and Putin/Medvedev eras was driven by the same basic demand for restoring stability and prosperity after the post-Soviet decline. Similarly, shifts in the pattern of loadings in the trust

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[7] This is because some of the questions in the Levada were only asked in one of these periods; also, I exclude items that have less than five observations when calculating the latent regime support dimensions for the Yeltsin and Putin/Medvedev periods to ensure the stability of the estimates with the dyad ratios algorithm.

[8] The table includes only items which have 15 cases or more in each period, which ensures that estimates are based on long enough series to allow for meaningful comparison.

cluster do not signal substantive differences in the considerations driving the regime support dimension across the two periods. Trust in the president, security services and the media became more closely associated with regime support in the 2000s simply because these institutions emerged as the key pillars of the political system after Putin's ascendance, not because the reasons why Russians endorsed their regime has changed. The robust propaganda machine of the Putin regime, in other words, did not seem to produce discrepancies in the structure of the main dimension of popular opinion, whereby people's crisis-centric outlooks were associated to regime support during Yeltsin's presidency and not during the Putin/Medvedev era, or vice versa.

These results also show that Russians were not brainwashed into believing that withdrawing support for their regimes will lead to greater instability. If anything, the opposite is true: the pattern of loadings in Table A.3.1 strongly indicates that rising concerns about instability and worse evaluations of background circumstances correlated with *lower* popular endorsement of Russia's regime both the Yeltsin and the Putin/Medvedev eras. Put differently, as people sensed greater instability, they tended to blame and renounce their electoral authoritarian regime, not rally around it. The fact that this behavior became even more pronounced in the Putin/Medvedev era, when the regime had far greater media control, further indicates that propaganda had little impact on these underlying opinion currents. If the goal of Putinist propaganda was to convince people to double their support for the regime when things were going badly, it clearly failed.

Taken together, these results suggest that propaganda did not play a decisive role in shaping the rationale as to why Russians supported their post-Soviet regime. Both in the Yeltsin era, when the Kremlin lacked the media control to shape people's political views, and in the tightly controlled media environment of the Putin era, popular support for Russia's regime was associated with demands for restoring stability and prosperity. The differences in the loadings of specific attitudes on the regime support dimension are in line with this conclusion, and only

represent contextual variations in the specific priorities and demands related to stabilization in the two periods.

Table A.3.1 Loadings of Issue Scales on the Principal Dimension of Russian Opinion: Selected Items

	Abbreviated Question	Yeltsin Era Loading	Putin/Medvedev Era Loading
Primary Concerns	Concerned about: Delays in payment of wages	0.28 (15)	-0.76 (19)
	Concerned about: Weakness of state authority	-0.38 (32)	-0.71 (20)
	Concerned about: Crime	-0.62 (32)	-0.71 (20)
	Concerned about: Conflicts btw. branches of government	-0.69 (32)	-0.64 (19)
	Concerned about: Rise of nationalism	-0.05 (32)	-0.59 (18)
	Concerned about: Crisis in the economy	-0.26 (32)	-0.35 (19)
	Concerned about: Rise in unemployment	0.34 (32)	-0.32 (20)
	Concerned about: Corruption	0.08 (32)	-0.32 (20)
	Concerned about: Environmental degradation	-0.60 (32)	0.15 (20)
	Concerned about: Unjust distribution of incomes	0.07 (21)	-0.11 (19)
	Concerned about: Crisis in culture, morality	-0.59 (32)	0.06 (20)
	Concerned about: Rising prices	-0.81 (32)	0.04 (20)
Trust in Institutions	Trusts the President of Russia	0.01 (16)	0.91 (17)
	Trusts State Security Services	-0.20 (16)	0.76 (17)
	Trusts Media	0.15 (16)	0.74 (17)
	Trusts the Church	-0.24 (16)	0.67 (17)
	Trusts State Duma (Parliament)	0.35 (16)	0.64 (17)
	Trusts Republican Authorities	0.44 (16)	0.48 (17)
	Trusts Unions	0.37 (16)	0.40 (17)
	Trusts Russian Government	-0.22 (16)	0.35 (17)
	Trusts Municipal Authorities	0.58 (16)	0.26 (17)
	Trusts the Army	-0.53 (16)	-0.11 (17)
Current Assessments	Current Political Situation: favorable and tranquil	0.65 (46)	0.96 (65)
	Life satisfaction: fully or largely satisfied	0.50 (45)	0.94 (64)
	Current financial condition of respondents' families: good and very good	-0.33 (45)	0.93 (65)
	Current Economic Situation: good and very good	0.42 (46)	0.92 (65)
	Describe current situation in general: things not so bad	0.15 (46)	0.92 (65)
	Current Econ. Sit. in your city/rural area: good and very good	0.22 (45)	0.91 (65)
	Respondent personal mood: excellent or normal	0.24 (46)	0.90 (65)
	General direction of Russia good	0.94 (40)	0.89 (111)
	Economy in the next year: good	0.85 (18)	0.85 (48)
	Expect better life next year	0.54 (33)	0.74 (51)
	Economy in the next 5 years: good	0.76 (16)	0.65 (48)
	Family income increased more than prices in the past month	0.60 (35)	0.61 (49)
	Now is a good time for large domestic purchases	0.87 (33)	0.60 (64)
	Russian politics in the coming months: expect to improve	0.81 (35)	0.50 (65)
	Wage payment situation in your area: getting better	0.21 (26)	-0.29 (71)
	Russian economy in the coming months: expect to improve	0.84 (35)	0.27 (65)
Pol. Att.	Market reforms should be continued	0.91 (30)	0.66 (50)
Political Participation	Protests with econ. demands in respondents' area considered likely	-0.13 (45)	0.25 (64)
	Will participate in protests in local area	-0.09 (46)	-0.12 (64)
	Protests with pol. demands in respondents' area considered likely	-0.60 (17)	0.05 (64)
	Will vote in Duma elections	0.37 (30)	0.02 (18)
Percent variance explained		30.17	40

Note: the number of months each survey item was administered is given in the parentheses

2. An Examination of Response Patterns across Different Groups

As an additional test of the possible effects of propaganda on Russian popular opinion, I adapt an empirical test from Zaller and Geddes,[1] who suggest that the greatest potential for resistance to regime indoctrination might be found among population strata with superior capacity for critical judgment, exposure to alternative views, and espousal of liberal values – attributes that tend to correlate highly with education. At the same time, these authors argue that the effect of regime indoctrination is also moderated by the citizens' exposure to propaganda, proxied by their levels of political information.

If propaganda has a major influence on popular opinion, Zaller and Geddes suggest, it will produce divergence of opinions among these groups. Those that are highly educated and most informed, and thus exposed to regime indoctrination, are also most capable of resisting it. The least educated and the least informed are also not likely to be heavily swayed by the proverbial "party line," as their ignorance protects them from it. Those at middle levels of education and information, in contrast, tend to be the most susceptible group – they are sufficiently exposed to propaganda, but lack sufficient cognitive resources to resist it. Different contexts might produce variation in these response patterns, but the basic metric is simple: if propaganda has a major influence on opinions, it will produce divergent responses among the education and political information groups.

To test this in the Russian case, I perform two sets of analyses. First, I re-estimate the latent regime support dimension of Russian popular opinion using Stimson's dyad ratios algorithm separately for each of the three standard education categories – less than high school, high school graduates and college attendees and graduates. This procedure produces three indices analogous

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[1] Geddes, Barbara, and John Zaller. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science*, 1989, 319–47.

to the latent Russian regime support series described in the chapter. These, however, potentially retain important systematic differences between education groups that might cancel out in the process of aggregation into a single series.

A visual representation of the regime support levels disaggregated by education is given in Figure A.3.1 below. It is clear that the series very closely match each other. Save for a few higher peaks for the some college and above category in the period after 2000, and slightly lower values for the less than high school category mostly before 2000, the parallelism is too great to warrant any substantive distinctions between the three series. Their very high correlations (in excess of 0.98) and differences in mean levels of less than 3 percent – about the size of the sampling error in the constituent surveys – also confirm the impression that the series are virtually indistinguishable from each other.

Figure A.3.1: The Primary Dimension of Russian Aggregate Public Opinion by Education, 1993-2011

These findings indicate there was a virtually consensual assessment of Russia's post-Communist regime across education groups. This close parallelism of the primary dimension of Russian aggregate opinion across education groups provides assurance that it has not been significantly influenced by indoctrination, even after the country's regime became significantly more authoritarian after Putin's rise in the 2000s. If the opposite was true, it is unlikely that the regime support indices of these population groups with different capacities to resist regime propaganda and coercion would not have registered at least some notable discrepancies.

To further verify this, I also estimate response patterns across both different levels of education and political information. An issue here is that the Levada "Courier," "Monitoring"

and "Fakt" surveys do not contain measures of political information to allow me to perform this analysis with the dyad ratios estimate of the latent regime support trend. Instead, I use the direct but analogous measure of support for Russia's political system contained in the New Russia Barometer surveys, also carried out by the Levada center. As a measure of political awareness, I use the sum of correct answers on three factual questions about Russian politics, asking respondents to name the current Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, as well as the Governor and Member of Parliament from his or her region. Albeit somewhat coarse, this measure does a good job in capturing the substantive variation in political awareness across respondents.[2]

I compare aggregate levels of regime support by education and political awareness across two NRB surveys for which the political awareness measure is available. Carried out in July 2001, a year after the election of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency, and in June 2003, a year before his re-election, these surveys come before and after the regime fully established control of the media. Hence, in addition to capturing variation across education and political awareness levels, these surveys provide some clues as to whether these patterns changed over time, as Russia's electoral autocracy consolidated its grip under Putin's reign.

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[2] Across the surveys used for this analysis, 8-13 percent of respondents had zero correct responses, 29-33 percent had one correct reply, 40-48 percent had two correct answers, and about 16 percent of respondents had the maximum of three correct answers. The correlation between this measure of political awareness and education is a modest 0.14, which corresponds to the expectation of Zaller and Geddes that these two indicators capture different aspects of respondents' exposure and resistance to political propaganda.

Figure A.3.2: Regime Support by Education and Political Awareness

The results of this analysis, shown in Figure A.3.2, broadly correspond with those from Figure A.3.1. The three education groups exhibit comparable degrees of support for Russia's political regime across all levels of political awareness, with the lowest support levels found among the least educated. The mean support levels for the low, medium and high education groups were -6, 4 and 6 in 2001 and -1, 13 and 14 in 2003, and exhibit relatively little change around these values across levels of political awareness. Given that the regime support scale varies between -100 and 100, these differences are minor. These patterns are also consistent across the two surveys, although the increase in the mean support levels is somewhat greater for the middle and high education groups in 2003. The only "outlier" in this analysis is the change in regime support among the most highly educated but least politically aware (those that gave zero correct answers to the factual questions about politics), which rose from about -2 to 40 between

2001 and 2003. However, this result is driven by responses from only 10 survey participants in this category in the 2003 survey and does not seem to be representative.[3]

In conclusion, these analyses, together with the results from the previous section, provide consistent evidence that popular support for Russia's electoral autocracy did not seem to be substantially biased by regime propaganda. Instead, as suggested by this chapter's argument, Russian survey responses on questions about the country's political system and its leaders seem to have largely been genuine. This should not be interpreted, however, as an indication the media control and manipulation did not have a substantial effect on the consolidation of Russia's autocracy. Instead, the influence of these tools has been more subtle, as some studies have indicated – not aimed at manipulating perceptions of objective circumstances, but denigrating alternatives to the current regime and stoking fears of change in people's minds.[4] This negative campaigning, as I showed in Chapter 4, is consistent with the strongman heresthetic legitimation strategy.

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[3] I have also performed two additional analyses of regime support across education and political awareness levels using the 2004 and 2009 NRB surveys, and these do not record similar "outliers." I do not present the results from the 2004 and 2009 surveys here as the political awareness scale is based on different factual questions, so they are not fully comparable to the results in Figure A.3.2, but the patterns they reveal are very similar.
[4] See e.g. Gehlbach, S., 2010. Reflections on Putin and the Media. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 26(1), pp.77–87.

PART 4: Cross-Sectional Estimates of the Main Dimension of Russian Popular Opinion

To obtain cross-sectional estimates of the two dimensions of Russian popular opinion, I follow Stimson, Thiébaut, and Tiberj (2012): I estimate the principal components on a group of survey items that are expected to be most closely related to the regime support dimension.[13] This approach ensures that the cross-sectional principal components estimates will isolate the same latent dimension as the one obtained with the dyad ratios algorithm. A key obstacle for this analysis is the problem of missing data, which prevents me from fully replicating the aggregate-level analysis at the micro-level. As the closest available alternative, I perform the cross-sectional principal components analysis using 26 surveys between 1996 and 2008, which contain the same set of 24 questions: 10 items from the primary concerns, 11 from the current assessments, and 1 from the policy attitudes clusters.

A solution with one dimension emerges as the most adequate representation of the underlying constituent opinions. Furthermore, in spite of the significant noise of the individual-level survey data, the loadings across the various surveys are highly robust to alternative specifications and consistent with the findings in the aggregate-level analyses.

Indeed, the pattern of loadings of the survey items on the two dimensions is remarkably consistent with the aggregate-level analysis with the dyad ratios algorithm. On the main dimension, trust in the president, and positive assessments and expectations about politics and economics achieve the highest loadings, while evaluations of family finances and preferences about market reforms exhibit somewhat lower positive loadings. In Table A.4.1 below, I present

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[13] Stimson, James, Cyrille Thiébaut, and Vincent Tiberj. "The Evolution of Policy Attitudes in France." *European Union Politics* 13, no. 2 (2012): 293–316.

these item loadings for five representative surveys, conducted at the time of the Russian presidential and parliamentary elections in June 1996, March 2000, March 2004, March 2008 and December 2011.

But do the individual-level estimates, extracted with cross-sectional principal components, also exhibit the same over-time behavior as the aggregate-level estimates of the principal dimension of Russian public opinion, obtained with the dyad ratios algorithm? To examine this, I follow Stimson (2002),[14] who compares the over-time correlation of dyad ratios estimates with mean factor scores from cross-sectional principal components analysis. Rescaled on a 0 to 100 range, the mean factor scores represent a micro-level analogue of the aggregate estimates of the main dimensions of Russian popular opinion.

Figure A.4.1 below displays the over-time behavior of the primary dimension mean factor scores extracted with cross-sectional principal components analysis to those estimated with the dyad ratios algorithm. The corresponding series match each other remarkably well, despite the fact that the individual-level estimates are obtained through a different mode of aggregation, and using a much narrower set of items. The correlation among the primary regime support dimension series is 0.96, which also implies they relate to the same underlying popular sentiments, and thus share the same meaning. Taken together, these analyses confirm that the dimensional estimates obtained through these different approaches reflect the same underlying popular sentiments and have the same substantive meaning.

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[14] Stimson, J., 2002. The Micro Foundations of Mood. In Kuklinski, James H., ed. *Thinking About Political Psychology*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 253–280.

FIGURE A.4.1: ESTIMATING THE PRIMARY DIMENSION OF RUSSIAN POPULAR OPINION: A CROSS-METHODS COMPARISON

Table A.4.1 The Two Dimensions of Russian Popular Opinion: Cross-Sectional Principal Components Analyses

	July 1996	March 2000	March 2004	March 2008	December 2011
Trust in the President	0.33	0.23	0.28	0.27	
Trust in the Government	0.28	0.24	0.25	0.28	
Assessment of the current economic situation	0.28	0.29	0.31	0.32	0.40
Assessments of the local economic situation	0.28	0.28	0.26	0.28	0.36
Assessments of the current political situation	0.23	0.20	0.25	0.31	0.34
Current financial condition of respondents' families	0.26	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.36
Expectations about life next year	0.29	0.32	0.32	0.28	
Expectations about the economy in the coming months	0.34	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.39
Expectations about politics in the coming months	0.34	0.36	0.31	0.32	0.38
Preferences about market reforms	0.26	0.26	0.28	0.23	
How bearable is the current situation	0.32	0.34	0.34	0.29	0.34
Respondent personal mood	0.23	0.27	0.22	0.25	0.24
Willingness to vote in presidential elections		0.01	0.07		
Expectations about protests with econ. demands					
Willingness to participate in protests in local area					
Expectations about protests with political demands					
Eigenvalue	4.86	3.82	3.94	4.28	3.52
Percent variance explained	40	29.37	30.31	35.66	44.01

PART 5: Models of Vote Choice in the 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008 Russian Presidential Elections

Table A.5.1: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Vote Choice in the 1996 Russian Presidential Elections (Yeltsin as Base Category)

	Zyuganov	Yavlinsky	Zhirinovski	Lebed	Nonvoters
Regime support	-0.76	-0.06	-0.14	-0.18	-0.29
	$(0.13)^{**}$	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.14)	$(0.12)^{*}$
Support tough	0.41	0.14	0.71	0.44	0.15
dictatorship	$(0.10)^{**}$	(0.16)	$(0.15)^{**}$	$(0.13)^{**}$	(0.10)
Favors	-0.18	0.18	-0.03	-0.13	-0.03
achievement-based	$(0.10)^{+}$	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.10)
incomes					
Favors free prices	-0.53	0.03	-0.62	-0.35	-0.21
	$(0.11)^{**}$	(0.15)	$(0.16)^{**}$	$(0.13)^{**}$	$(0.11)^{+}$
Assessment of	-0.28	-0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.09
Russian economy	$(0.13)^{*}$	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Family financial	-0.43	-0.52	-0.52	-0.46	-0.38
situation	$(0.12)^{**}$	$(0.16)^{**}$	$(0.19)^{**}$	$(0.13)^{**}$	$(0.11)^{**}$
Age	-0.05	-0.13	-0.53	-0.40	-0.65
	(0.11)	(0.14)	$(0.17)^{**}$	$(0.13)^{**}$	$(0.10)^{**}$
Female	-0.17	0.28	-0.27	-0.03	0.02
	$(0.10)^{+}$	$(0.13)^{*}$	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Education	-0.14	0.19	-0.35	0.04	-0.24
	(0.10)	(0.15)	$(0.17)^{*}$	(0.12)	$(0.11)^{*}$
Income quintile	-0.15	0.08	0.02	-0.20	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.16)	$(0.11)^{+}$	(0.11)
Unemployed	-0.16	-0.16	0.21	-0.22	-0.08
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.15)	$(0.11)^{+}$	(0.09)
Constant	-0.35	-1.58	-1.91	-0.72	0.33
	$(0.11)^{**}$	$(0.15)^{**}$	$(0.19)^{**}$	$(0.11)^{**}$	$(0.11)^{**}$
Observations			1459		
Log-likelihood			-2042.32		

Robust standard errors in parentheses; $^{+} p < 0.10$, $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$

Table A.5.2: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Vote Choice in the 2000 Russian Presidential Elections (Putin as Base Category)

	Zyuganov	Yavlinsky	Nonvoters
Regime cleavage	-0.36	-0.07	-0.19
	$(0.11)^{**}$	(0.19)	$(0.10)^{+}$
Support tough dictatorship	0.06	-0.32	-0.20
	(0.10)	$(0.16)^{*}$	$(0.09)^{*}$
Private ownership better	-0.16	0.09	-0.05
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.09)
Prevent separation of Chechnya	0.00	-0.11	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.10)
Assessment of Russian economy	-0.15	-0.08	0.17
	(0.11)	(0.19)	$(0.10)^{+}$
Family financial situation	-0.25	-0.29	-0.30
	$(0.10)^{**}$	$(0.17)^{+}$	$(0.09)^{**}$
Age	0.43	-0.10	-0.45
	$(0.10)^{**}$	(0.16)	$(0.11)^{**}$
Female	-0.29	-0.31	-0.14
	$(0.10)^{**}$	$(0.16)^{+}$	(0.09)
Education	0.14	0.63	-0.13
	(0.11)	$(0.22)^{**}$	(0.10)
Income quintile	0.02	0.69	0.06
	(0.10)	$(0.21)^{**}$	(0.10)
Unemployed	0.04	0.22	0.39
	(0.12)	(0.17)	$(0.08)^{**}$
Constant	-0.69	-2.80	-0.42
	$(0.10)^{**}$	$(0.22)^{**}$	$(0.10)^{**}$
Observations		1255	
Log-likelihood		-1672.44	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; $^{+} p < 0.10$, $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$

Table A.5.3: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Vote Choice in the 2004 Russian Presidential Elections (Putin as Base Category)

	Kharitonov	Non_voters
Regime cleavage	-0.56	-0.14
	$(0.16)^{**}$	(0.10)
Support tough dictatorship	0.38	0.23
	$(0.12)^{**}$	$(0.09)^{**}$
Private ownership better	-0.71	-0.20
	$(0.19)^{**}$	$(0.09)^{*}$
Prevent separation of Chechnya	-0.19	0.06
	(0.14)	(0.08)
Assessment of Russian economy	-0.20	-0.12
	(0.15)	(0.10)
Family financial situation	-0.35	-0.08
	$(0.16)^{*}$	(0.09)
Age (standardized)	0.63	-0.42
	$(0.19)^{**}$	$(0.10)^{**}$
Female (standardized)	-0.46	-0.21
	$(0.14)^{**}$	$(0.09)^{*}$
Education (standardized)	0.03	-0.05
	(0.13)	(0.09)
Income quintile (standardized)	0.08	-0.12
	(0.14)	(0.09)
Unemployed (standardized)	-0.15	0.15
	(0.25)	$(0.08)^{+}$
Constant	-2.37	-0.31
	$(0.22)^{**}$	$(0.09)^{**}$
Observations	920	
Log-likelihood	-947.272	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; $^{+} p < 0.10$, $^{*} p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$

Table A.5.4: Multinomial Logit Estimates of Vote Choice in the 2008 Russian Presidential Elections (Medvedev as Base Category)

	Zhirinovski	Zyuganov	Non voters
Regime cleavage	-0.31	-0.41	-0.43
	$(0.16)^+$	$(0.12)^{**}$	$(0.11)^{**}$
Support tough dictatorship	0.18	0.25	-0.07
	(0.16)	$(0.12)^*$	(0.10)
Continue market reforms	-0.30	-0.60	-0.31
	$(0.17)^+$	$(0.11)^{**}$	$(0.10)^{**}$
Future of Russia is with the West	0.04	-0.26	0.11
	(0.14)	$(0.14)^+$	(0.10)
Assessment of Russian economy	-0.10	-0.22	-0.15
	(0.15)	$(0.12)^+$	(0.11)
Family financial situation	-0.04	-0.31	-0.33
	(0.20)	$(0.14)^*$	$(0.11)^{**}$
Age	-0.44	0.48	-0.32
	$(0.17)^*$	$(0.16)^{**}$	$(0.11)^{**}$
Female (standardized)	-0.33	-0.19	-0.24
	$(0.16)^*$	(0.12)	$(0.10)^*$
Education (standardized)	-0.17	-0.02	-0.14
	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.10)
Income quintile (standardized)	-0.03	0.13	0.15
	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.11)
Unemployed (standardized)	0.16	-0.22	-0.01
	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.10)
Constant	-2.24	-1.49	-0.58
	$(0.17)^{**}$	$(0.15)^{**}$	$(0.10)^{**}$
Observations		857	
Log-likelihood		-1075.4	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; $^+ p < 0.10$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$