APPENDIX

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS AND ANALYSES

Cleavage Formation in the 21st Century – How Social Identities Shape Voting Behavior in Contexts of Electoral Realignment

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Chapter 2: How We Study Collective Identities

Operationalizing identity

As chapter 2 outlines, we conceptualize cleavage identities as 1) mediating between social structure and politics, 2) comprising both in-group and out-group understandings ("us" versus "them" (building both on Social Identity Theory and notions of boundary-drawing in sociology), and 3) as encompassing an important affective component. In this last sense, our understanding of cleavage identities builds on Tajfel (1981, 255), who defines identity as "that part of the individual's self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership." This emotional aspect and the conceptualization of identities as core to self-understandings and related outlooks also sets identities apart from more specific issue attitudes or ideology.

Validating our measure of identity

Following the points listed above, our central measure of closeness to various social groups allows us to 1) examine the relationship to socio-structural variables and political outcomes, 2) it captures both in-group and out-group identification, and 3) it conceivably captures both cognitive and affective components of identity. The wording of this survey item is adapted from work in the tradition of Social Identity Theory (Mason & Wronski 2018), and it builds on our own past work (Bornschier et al. 2021). Ideally, we would measure identification with any one specific group along multiple dimensions with more extensive item batteries (see e.g. Hobolt, Leeper, Tilley 2021 on Brexit identities or Stubager 2009 on educational identities). However, for our purposes, it made sense to prioritize studying a wide range of identities with the closeness item rather than studying few identities with more items. We chose a measure that simultaneously captures in-groups and out-groups (including, supposedly, certain stereotypes or out-group bias) and cognitive as well as affective components. While it would be nice to be able to disentangle these elements for all the 17 groups that we ask about, we are ultimately more interested in capturing people's broader mental maps or society. We can show that the closeness item does this well:

First, ingroup identities ought to be associated with positive emotions, while outgroup identities should correlate with negative emotions. In our surveys, we asked respondents to indicate their experiences of pride, fear, and anger for their three closest and their three most distal groups. One would expect pride to be significantly higher for the closes than for the most distal groups and it is: pooling across countries, the means for the closest and most distal groups are 3.2 and 2.4, respectively ($p < 0.05$ for the t-test). By contrast, one would expect fear and anger to be highest for the most distal groups and, again, they are. The mean levels of fear are 2.2 and 2.5 for the closest and furthest groups, respectively. While fear does not appear to be a prominent emotion for any of the groups, the difference is still statistically significant in a t-test ($p < 0.5$). The mean levels of anger are 2.4 and 3, respectively, and once more statistically significant at the 0.05-level. We view this as evidence that our identity questions indeed tap into identities, especially their affective component.

Second, social identities (and cleavage identities especially) should be related to real-life social ties. We explore this aspect here for the identities that positively discriminate on the first function in Table 4.1, to wit feminists, people with a migration background, cosmopolitans, and the culturally interested. These are the identities associated with the conflict between the Far Right and the Left. We correlate the closeness a person feels to each of these groups with their

level of contact, which is measured on a 4-point scale with categories "once a year or less," "several times a year," "once or several times a week," and "daily." Averaging over the various identities, the polychoric correlations range from 0.53 ($p < 0.05$) in France to 0.62 ($p < 0.05$) in Switzerland. Both the size and the direction of the correlation support our interpretation qua identities.

Third, as is discussed extensively in Chapter 3, subjective closeness to the more sociostructurally defined groups that we ask about consistently also relate to the corresponding objective socio-structural group characteristics. For instance, objective urban/rural residence is indeed a strong predictor of subjective urban/rural identification. This further bolsters our confidence that we are capturing identity with our closeness question.

Fourth, additional results presented below indicate that our measure indeed captures group identification rather than attitudes or ideology. While our group identification variables correlate with issue preferences in expected ways, the correlations are moderate (see below). Identities and attitudes respectively tend to be more strongly correlated with each other than identities are with attitudes. The strongest identity-attitude correlation concerns closeness to people with a migration background, which is negatively correlated with an attitudinal measure of perceived economic and cultural threat from migration to the respondents' country (at -0.4; for comparison, the two migration attitude questions are correlated at 0.75). Identity-attitude correlations generally point in expected directions but are rather low. For instance, feminist identity is barely correlated with the attitude that family life suffers when women work full time (-0.2). Adopting a pro-gender-equality stance on issues is not the same as self-identifying as feminist. Similarly, Euroskepticism is negatively correlated with closeness to cosmopolitans, as we would expect, but weakly so (-0.2). Even the identities that can be viewed as most value-based correlate only moderately with the corresponding attitudes, indicating that these self-identification is distinct from ideology.

Figure A2.1: Correlations between identities and attitudes

Fifth, many of the closed-ended group categories that we ask about appear in some form or other in open-ended questions about group identification. Indeed, research based on voters own descriptions of "people like them"/"people not at all like them" informed our choice of closed-ended identity questions (Zollinger 2022), as did previous ethnographic work (e.g. Cramer 2016, Hochschild 2016, Damhuis 2020). We expand on the choice of groups below, but the fact that voters themselves reference co-nationals, cosmopolitan people, etc. when describing in-groups and, e.g., urban people, foreigners, or xenophobic people in their unprompted descriptions of "people not like them" indicates to us that we are tapping into key aspects of identity and hence into the broader "mental maps of society" that we are interested in from a cleavage theory perspective.

Figure A2.2: Distribution of closeness to 17 social groups

|	Cultural group identities						
	"Cosmopoli-tans"	"People who are down to earth and rooted to home"	"People with a migration background"	Swiss people	"Feminists"	"Culturally interested people"	"People with christian-western values"
Education group closest	High	Medium	High	Medium	High	High	High
CECT significant	positive	negative	positive		positive	positive	negative
Class closest	MNG, SCP	PW	SCP		SCP	SCP	MNG
Class most distant	PW	SCP	PW		PW	PW, SW	TECH
Territorial group closest	Big city	suburban	Big city	rural	Big city	Big city	

Table A3.1. Main socio-structural correlates of feeling close towards different culturally connoted identity groups – Switzerland

	Cultural group identities						
	"Cosmopoli-tans"	"People who are down to earth and rooted to home"	"People with a migration background"	German people	"Feminists"	"Culturally interested people"	"People with christian-western values"
Education group closest	High	Low	High	low	High	High	High
CECT significant	positive	negative	positive		positive	positive	negative
Class closest	SCP	PW	SCP	PW	SCP	SCP	
Class most distant	PW	SCP	PW	SCP	PW	PW	
Territorial group closest	Big city	Small town/ rural	Big city		Big city		

Table A3.2. Main socio-structural correlates of feeling close towards different culturally connoted identity groups – Germany

	Cultural group identities						
	"Cosmopoli-tans"	"People who are down to earth and rooted to home"	"People with a migration background"	French people	"Feminists"	"Culturally interested people"	"People with christian-western values"
Education group closest	High	Low/medium	High	low	High	High	
CECT significant		negative	positive		positive	positive	negative
Class closest	MNG	PW, SW	MNG	PW	MNG, SCP	SCP, MNG	MNG
Class most distant	PW	SCP	PW	SCP	SW	PW	PW, SW
Territorial group closest	Big city	Small town/rural	Big city		Big city	Big city	Big city, suburban

Table A3.3. Main socio-structural correlates of feeling close towards different culturally connoted identity groups – France

	Cultural group identities						
	"Cosmopoli-tans"	"People who are down to earth and rooted to home"	"People with a migration background"	British people	"Feminists"	"Culturally interested people"	"People with christian-western values"
Education group closest	High	Low/medium	High	low	High	High	
CECT significant		negative	positive	negative	positive	positive	negative
Class closest	MNG	PW	MNG, SCP		SCP	SCP, MNG	MNG
Class most distant	PW, SW	SCP	PW		Clerks	PW	SCP, SW
Territorial group closest	Big city		Big city		Big city	Big city	

Table A3.4. Main socio-structural correlates of feeling close towards different culturally connoted identity groups – UK

Chapter 4: How Social Identities Shape Political Behavior

The first part of the appendix to this chapter extends the analysis by identifying the most important in-groups and outgroups of each party block and assessing the impact of these identities on vote choice based on multivariate regression analysis. The second part of the appendix documents the closeness of the voters of the three party blocks to each of the 17 group identities per country (while the discussion in Chapter 4 itself focused on the most interesting results).

Identities as Predictors of Vote Choice

The analyses in the main text of Chapter 4 suggested that group identities correlate strongly with alignments along the three ideological blocks. Here, we move to a multivariate setting in which we gauge the effect of the most salient identities on vote choice, controlling for social structural variables. For each electorate, we identify the three most distinctive ingroups and outgroups and include them in a multivariate regression model. The detailed results of these regressions are presented at the end of this section. Table A4.1 summarizes the three most distinctive ingroups and outgroups across the four countries, based on the results presented in Chapter 4. To determine the most relevant in- and outgroups for every electorate, we use the average closeness rating by electorate and group. For each of the 17 groups, we calculated the distance of partisans' average closeness from the country sample mean (as shown in Figures 4.1-4.3 in the main text). This allows us to determine which social groups partisans identify with or demarcate themselves from most distinctively.

			Left voters	Right voters	Far Right voters	Right Liberal voters (only France)
Ingroups	*in countries*	4	feminists, migration background	christian-western values		
	in countries	3		wealthy (GER, UK, FR), nationals (GER, UK, FR)	nationals (UK, GER, CH), rural (CH, GER, UK), hard work (FR, GER, UK)	
	in countries	2	cosmopolitans (CH, FR), cultured (UK, GER)		down to earth (CH, FR)	
	in 1 country			highly educated (CH)	humble financial means (FR)	cosmopolitan, wealthy, highly educated
Outgroups	*in countries*	4	nationals	feminists	migration background, cosmopolitans	
	in countries	3	christian-western values (GER, FR, UK)	humble financial means (CH, GER, UK)	feminists (GER, CH, UK)	
	in countries	2	wealthy (CH, FR), rural (CH, GER)	cosmopolitans (CH, FR), migration backgrund (GER, FR)		
	in 1 country		down to earth (CH)		people working in the social and education sector (F)	humble financial means, low educated, down to earth

Table A4.1: Most distinctive in- and outgroups by party electorates and countries (based on average voters' closeness distance from the country sample mean)

Again, the similarity in the findings across the countries is striking. Left voters across all four countries feel much closer to "feminists" and "people with migration background" than the average respondent. In addition, voters of the Left also stand out as being distinctively close

either to "cosmopolitans" or "culturally interested people". This similarity is particularly noteworthy as our category of "New Left voters" is very large and encompasses Green, Social Democratic, and Radical Left party voters (to the extent that the analysis based on CHES data in Chapter 2 revealed that they exhibit New Left ideological profiles). Despite this heterogeneity in the make-up of the New Left, respondents' self-definition of what it means to be a left voter today is very consistent across countries and – most importantly – clearly reflects the universalism-particularism cleavage. Variation is somewhat larger when it comes to the outgroups of these voters, but their distance to "Swiss, German, British or French people" stands out in all countries. Among the outgroups, only Swiss and French Left voters clearly demarcate themselves from the "wealthy" as one of the key relative outgroups. Besides that, more culturally connoted outgroups, such as "rural" and "Christian-western values", prevail.

At the other end of the spectrum, voters of the Far Right are similar in their distinctive positive identification with and negative demarcation from culturally connoted groups. The symmetry with the left is particularly strong when it comes to outgroups. Strikingly, the Left's ingroups are almost perfectly mirrored in terms of the key Far Right outgroups. The ingroups of Far Right voters are somewhat more varied, but also here, culturally connoted groups stand out: "nationals", "rural people", "people doing hard and tiring work" and people who are "down to earth and rooted to home". This clear and highly consistent antagonism between the in- and outgroups of the two key electorates along the universalism-particularism divide is evidence in favor of a joint collective identity foundation along the new cleavage. We draw on these additional analyses in the conclusion to Chapter 4.

The voters of the mainstream Right also share quite consistent images of themselves and their outgroups across countries, but they refer to distinctive identities as affirmative ingroups (in particular "people with Christian-western values" and the "wealthy") and they seem to demarcate themselves with regard to culturally connoted groups ("feminists") as much as with regard to economically connoted groups ("humble financial means"). Interestingly, the in- and outgroups of the French Right Liberal voters (LREM and Modem) are quite distinctive, as they clearly reflect a unique combination of economically and culturally defined identities: Supporters of Macron's movement most distinctively identify with the "wealthy", "highly educated" and "cosmopolitans", and feel comparatively least close to the "low educated", "people with humble financial means", and people who are "down to earth and rooted to home". In other words, this electorate to some extent fuses identities that are characteristic for either New Left and the mainstream Right parties elsewhere. Rather than suggesting that France does

not fit our expectations, the antagonism between Macron's voters and those of the Far Right seems to fuse identities that are central to the new cleavage (cosmopolitan, down to earth) with economically connoted identities (those with humble financial means constitute the ingroup of the Far Right and the outgroup of the Right Liberals in France).[1]

These distinctive in- and outgroups are powerful predictors of party choice. We illustrate their importance in Figure A4.1, which presents predicted probabilities of voting for the Left and the Far Right party blocks depending on (a) education as the key socio-structural determinant of electoral realignment, and (b) closeness to "people with migration a background", "feminists", and "cosmopolitans", the group identities on which Left and Far Right voters are most strongly divided, and which turn out to be the strongest predictors of vote choice also in the country-specific regression models. The logistic regression models are multivariate (different from Figures 4.1-4.3 in the main text) and include age, sex, education, income, class, CECT and residency as socio-structural controls. The full regression results are provided below. Figure A4.4 shows the massive substantive link between these identities and party preference: Identification with or demarcation from the main culturally connoted groups is associated with on average 40-50 percentage points differences in the probability of voting for any of the New Left parties, and with 20-30 percentage point differences when it comes to voting for a Far Right party (which both is a more narrow party family and gathers a lower average vote share, hence the lower probabilities overall). The symmetry when it comes to New Left and Far Right voting is striking. It underlines our contention that we see the emergence of a new electoral cleavage, with the two extremes – New Left and Far Right – referring to each other in their self-perceptions. Interestingly, the Left vote is most strongly positively correlated with the culturally defined left-wing ingroups, while voting for the Far Right is most strongly negatively correlated with the Far Right's outgroups (which are the Left ingroups). This finding resonates with an interpretation of the Far Right being an antagonist to a New Left pole in Europe's party landscapes.

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[1] It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss possible explanations for this specific French configuration exhaustively. But it is quite plausible that the fusion of the economic and universalism-particularism cleavages into a single one is favoured by the majoritarian electoral system (while not neglecting the role of agency on the part of Macron, and the fact that the Rassemblement National positions itself more to the left on the economic dimension than its Far Right counterparts elsewhere, thereby explicitly championing the interests of those less well-off in economic terms). Another interpretation would be that Macron initially appeared as a rather typical New Left politician (he had even been part of the prior Socialist government), and then shifted to the right to mobilize former mainstream Right voters.

Figure A4.1: Education and key New Left ingroups resp. Far Right outgroups as determinants of the probability to vote for the New Left and the Far Right, respectively

	Left b/t	Left b/t	Far right b/t	Far Right b/t	Right b/t	Right b/t	Right Liberal b/t	Right Liberal b/t
Low educ	0.042	0.224	-0.101	-0.351	0.379	.	-0.039	.
	-0.2	-0.97	(-0.47)	(-1.43)	-1.5	.	(-0.15)	.
Medium educ	.	.	.	.	.	-0.309	.	-0.027
	.	.	.	.	.	(-1.13)	.	(-0.10)
High educ	-0.075	-0.105	-0.892***	-0.838***	0.066	-0.255	0.747***	0.543
	(-0.45)	(-0.55)	(-4.34)	(-3.63)	-0.31	(-0.83)	-3.85	-1.82
Small bus owners	0.067	0.01	0.063	-0.289	-0.705	-0.463	-0.039	-0.236
	-0.16	-0.02	-0.13	(-0.54)	(-0.85)	(-0.55)	(-0.08)	(-0.45)
Technical profs.	-0.084	-0.131	-0.679*	-0.626	0.304	0.332	0.416	0.19
	(-0.31)	(-0.43)	(-2.13)	(-1.77)	-0.86	-0.87	-1.42	-0.63
Prod workers	-0.253	-0.134	0.497	0.27	-0.105	-0.177	-0.516	-0.465
	(-0.97)	(-0.46)	-1.96	-0.93	(-0.28)	(-0.44)	(-1.50)	(-1.32)
Managers	0.202	0.194	-0.844***	-0.775**	0.593*	0.589	0.011	-0.293
	-0.93	-0.78	(-3.34)	(-2.69)	-2.11	-1.91	-0.04	(-1.10)
Clerks	0.287	0.281	-0.142	-0.13	-0.128	-0.096	-0.347	-0.501
	-1.26	-1.09	(-0.59)	(-0.47)	(-0.39)	(-0.27)	(-1.15)	(-1.62)
Socio-cult profs.	0.204	0.335	-0.889*	-1.061*	0.538	0.451	-0.06	-0.363
	-0.74	-1.04	(-2.40)	(-2.42)	-1.48	-1.12	(-0.18)	(-1.05)
Service workers	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
Big city	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
(sub)urban	-0.143	-0.163	0.254	0.271	-0.093	-0.065	0.112	0.163

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	(-0.82)	(-0.81)	-1.11	-1.05	(-0.42)	(-0.27)	-0.54	-0.76
small town/rural	-0.244	-0.151	0.595**	0.275	-0.362	-0.4	0.102	0.146
	(-1.33)	(-0.71)	-2.6	-1.05	(-1.51)	(-1.51)	-0.47	-0.64
<40	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
40-60	-0.833***	-0.750**	0.790**	0.875**	0.331	0.024	0.275	0.375
	(-3.84)	(-3.05)	-2.84	-2.76	-0.92	-0.06	-0.93	-1.23
>60	-1.201***	-1.198***	0.185	0.255	0.876*	0.646	0.881**	0.980**
	(-5.55)	(-4.85)	-0.66	-0.81	-2.54	-1.8	-3.04	-3.27
female	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
male	-0.221	-0.086	-0.107	-0.155	-0.023	-0.141	0.451**	0.404*
	(-1.53)	(-0.52)	(-0.63)	(-0.80)	(-0.12)	(-0.70)	-2.66	-2.28
CECT	0.555*	0.238	-0.229	-0.024	-0.345	-0.194	-0.462	-0.488
	-2.33	-0.89	(-0.83)	(-0.08)	(-1.08)	(-0.55)	(-1.63)	(-1.66)
ID Migration background		0.280***		-0.345***		-0.082		
		-7.28		(-7.75)		(-1.82)		
ID cosmopolitan		0.190***		-0.203***		-0.07		0.104**
		-4.5		(-4.52)		(-1.46)		-2.63
ID feminists		0.104**				-0.109*		
		-2.86				(-2.51)		
ID nationals		-0.076				0.05		
		(-1.77)				-0.95		
ID christian western values		-0.169***				0.236***		
		(-5.17)				-5.91		
ID wealthy		-0.214***				0.061		0.145**
		(-5.29)				-1.27		-3.22
ID down-to-earth / rooted				0.061				-0.074

				-1.24				(-1.66)
ID humble means				0.166***				-0.083
				-3.34				(-1.59)
ID hard working				0.104*				
				-2.13				
ID social and educational sector				-0.011				
				(-0.24)				
ID high educated								0.015
								-0.31
ID low educated								-0.028
								(-0.55)
cst	0.262	-0.423	-1.115**	-0.754	-2.295***	-2.464***	-2.317***	-2.360***
	-0.9	(-0.82)	(-3.14)	(-1.22)	(-5.29)	(-3.46)	(-6.06)	(-3.66)
R2	0.039	0.193	0.108	0.26	0.041	0.123	0.062	0.092
BIC	1392.355	1189.025	1113.315	959.268	982	906.566	1116.665	1104.35
N	1074	1036	1074	1041	1074	1036	1074	1043

Table A4.2: Socio-structural factors and key in- and outgroups as determinants of vote choice (France)

	Left	Left	Far right	Far Right	Right	Right
Low educ	-0.011	-0.026	0.047	0.054	0.045	.
	(-0.06)	(-0.14)	-0.29	-0.29	-0.24	.
Medium educ	.	.	.	.	.	-0.009
	.	.	.	.	.	(-0.05)
High educ	0.06	-0.24	-0.756***	-0.540***	0.500***	0.309
	-0.54	(-1.94)	(-6.37)	(-4.08)	-4.35	-1.53
Small bus owners	-0.358	-0.54	-0.296	-0.224	0.384	0.121
	(-1.41)	(-1.94)	(-1.13)	(-0.76)	-1.58	-0.53
Technical profs.	-0.079	-0.019	0.031	-0.075	-0.092	-0.333
	(-0.41)	(-0.09)	-0.15	(-0.33)	(-0.44)	(-1.87)
Prod workers	-0.101	-0.087	-0.085	0.012	0.059	-0.117
	(-0.49)	(-0.38)	(-0.41)	-0.05	-0.27	(-0.57)
Managers	-0.315	-0.514**	-0.093	0.065	0.238	.
	(-1.87)	(-2.75)	(-0.53)	-0.33	-1.35	.
Clerks	0.028	-0.005	-0.203	-0.077	0.078	-0.174
	-0.17	(-0.03)	(-1.16)	(-0.39)	-0.44	(-1.10)
Socio-cult profs.	0.189	0.073	-0.184	0.073	-0.096	-0.331
	-1.05	-0.36	(-0.86)	-0.3	(-0.47)	(-1.81)
Service workers	.	.	.	.	.	-0.185
	.	.	.	.	.	(-1.00)
Big city	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
(sub)urban	-0.429***	-0.185	0.529**	0.203	0.408**	0.421**
	(-3.30)	(-1.29)	-3.2	-1.11	-2.75	-2.73
small town/rural	-0.762***	-0.382*	0.905***	0.364	0.432**	0.412*
	(-5.31)	(-2.40)	-5.27	-1.88	-2.75	-2.51
<40	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
40-60	-0.590***	-0.481**	0.545**	0.443*	0.428**	0.323
	(-4.17)	(-3.11)	-3.11	-2.3	-2.61	-1.9
>60	-0.819***	-0.664***	0.671***	0.516**	0.458**	0.285
	(-6.02)	(-4.39)	-4.02	-2.8	-2.88	-1.71
female	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
male	-0.043	0.162	0.018	-0.145	0.18	-0.013
	(-0.43)	-1.44	-0.17	(-1.15)	-1.71	(-0.11)
CECT	0.878***	0.713***	-0.672***	-0.515*	-0.335	-0.283
	-5.22	-3.87	(-3.69)	(-2.49)	(-1.92)	(-1.56)
ID migration background		0.061*		-0.162***		

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		-2.42		(-6.15)		
ID cosmopolitan		0.180***		-0.150***		-0.056*
		-6.4		(-5.47)		(-2.32)
ID feminists		0.218***		-0.186***		-0.073***
		-9.89		(-7.53)		(-3.37)
ID down to earth / rooted		-0.096***		0.152***		
		(-3.30)		-4.41		
ID rural		-0.054		0.070*		
		(-1.93)		-2.18		
ID national		-0.072*		0.083*		
		(-2.42)		-2.51		
ID highly educated						0.032
						-1.12
ID wealthy						0.128***
						-4.66
ID christian western values						0.117***
						-5.75
ID humble means						-0.074**
						(-2.77)
cst	0.007	-1.170**	-1.444***	-0.970*	-1.988***	-1.720***
	-0.03	(-2.95)	(-5.36)	(-2.07)	(-7.64)	(-4.25)
R2	0.051	0.166	0.058	0.196	0.025	0.068
BIC	2686.063	2375.787	2441.45	2099.353	2581.101	2472.189
N	2148	2105	2148	2105	2148	2108

Table A4.3: Socio-structural factors and key in- and outgroups as determinants of vote choice (Switzerland)

	Left	Left	Far right	Far Right	Right	Right
Low educ	-0.272	-0.096	0.23	-0.065	0.384*	.
	(-1.66)	(-0.54)	-1.05	(-0.27)	-2.18	.
Medium educ	.	.	.	.	.	-0.399*
	.	.	.	.	.	(-2.18)
High educ	0.161	0.126	-0.243	-0.06	-0.019	-0.470*
	-1.27	-0.9	(-1.21)	(-0.27)	(-0.13)	(-2.18)
Small bus owners	-0.504	-0.635	0.037	0.174	0.006	-0.543
	(-1.70)	(-1.94)	-0.09	-0.38	-0.02	(-1.61)
Technical profs.	0.002	-0.004	-0.414	-0.598	0.313	-0.001
	-0.01	(-0.02)	(-1.46)	(-1.91)	-1.43	(-0.00)
Prod workers	-0.174	-0.109	0.132	-0.103	-0.239	-0.559*
	(-0.80)	(-0.47)	-0.47	(-0.33)	(-0.94)	(-2.33)
Managers	-0.11	-0.123	-0.637*	-0.578*	0.461*	.
	(-0.61)	(-0.62)	(-2.35)	(-1.96)	-2.28	.
Clerks	-0.079	-0.105	0	-0.017	0.073	-0.283
	(-0.44)	(-0.53)	(-0.00)	(-0.06)	-0.35	(-1.47)
Socio-cult profs.	0.309	0.091	-0.724*	-0.504	-0.182	-0.534*
	-1.46	-0.39	(-2.01)	(-1.28)	(-0.71)	(-2.18)
Service workers	.	.	.	.	.	-0.359
	.	.	.	.	.	(-1.68)
Big city	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
(sub)urban	-0.329**	-0.164	0.054	-0.182	0.1	0.024
	(-2.88)	(-1.29)	-0.32	(-0.93)	-0.76	-0.18
small town/rural	-0.553***	-0.333	0.148	-0.213	0.534**	0.571**
	(-3.45)	(-1.84)	-0.65	(-0.80)	-3.12	-3.2
<40	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
40-60	-0.431*	-0.207	0.468	0.074	0.346	0.332
	(-2.41)	(-1.06)	-1.72	-0.25	-1.59	-1.46
>60	-0.11	0.204	0.068	-0.356	0.444*	0.359
	(-0.66)	-1.12	-0.26	(-1.22)	-2.18	-1.67
female	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
male	-0.006	0.146	0.453**	0.562**	-0.132	-0.265
	(-0.05)	-1.16	-2.63	-2.91	(-1.02)	(-1.95)
CECT	0.463*	0.468*	-0.273	-0.396	-0.19	-0.16
	-2.43	-2.27	(-0.96)	(-1.26)	(-0.87)	(-0.70)
ID migration background		0.151***		-0.333***		0.103***
		-5.85		(-7.56)		-3.67

ID culturally interested		0.028				
		-0.98				
ID feminists		0.174***		-0.084*		-0.151***
		-6.91		(-2.09)		(-5.35)
ID nationals		-0.122***		0.101		0.122***
		(-3.92)		-1.92		-3.38
ID rural		-0.062*		0.065		
		(-2.30)		-1.72		
ID christian western values		-0.109***				0.103***
		(-4.97)				-4.44
ID hard working				0.120**		
				-2.65		
ID cosmopolitan				-0.141***		
				(-3.84)		
ID wealthy						0.078*
						-2.51
ID humble means						-0.043
						(-1.37)
cst	0.129	-0.023	-2.013***	-1.241	-1.567***	-2.148***
	-0.54	(-0.06)	(-5.67)	(-1.87)	(-5.54)	(-4.55)
R2	0.025	0.122	0.036	0.205	0.022	0.072
BIC	2175.88	1983.942	1257.246	1090.127	1837.901	1770.249
N	1542	1518	1542	1515	1542	1521

Table A4.4: Socio-structural factors and key in- and outgroups as determinants of vote choice (Germany)

	Left	Left	Far right	Far Right	Right	Right
Low educ	0.068	0.14	-0.185	-0.245	0.024	.
	-0.52	-1.01	(-0.76)	(-0.97)	-0.19	.
Medium educ	.	.	.	.	.	-0.038
	.	.	.	.	.	(-0.27)
High educ	0.439***	0.208	-0.673**	-0.385	-0.346***	-0.313*
	-4.28	-1.87	(-2.94)	(-1.62)	(-3.31)	(-2.13)
Small bus owners	-0.562*	-0.705**	0.526	0.591	0.225	0.128
	(-2.29)	(-2.63)	-1.24	-1.34	-0.91	-0.48
Technical profs.	-0.146	-0.189	-0.089	-0.005	0.141	-0.024
	(-0.81)	(-0.98)	(-0.23)	(-0.01)	-0.76	(-0.12)
Prod workers	-0.017	-0.043	0.443	0.392	-0.193	-0.228
	(-0.08)	(-0.19)	-1.17	-1	(-0.86)	(-0.97)
Managers	-0.346*	-0.415**	-0.131	0.044	0.383*	0.215
	(-2.34)	(-2.62)	(-0.42)	-0.14	-2.53	-1.33
Clerks	-0.205	-0.135	0.347	0.387	0.078	-0.143
	(-1.21)	(-0.74)	-1.04	-1.13	-0.44	(-0.77)
Socio-cult profs.	-0.004	-0.114	-0.513	-0.408	0.09	0.017
	(-0.02)	(-0.61)	(-1.21)	(-0.94)	-0.5	-0.09
Service workers	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
Big city	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
(sub)urban	-0.192*	-0.052	0.165	-0.012	0.142	0.079
	(-2.00)	(-0.50)	-0.77	(-0.05)	-1.44	-0.76
small town/rural	-0.321*	-0.068	0.832**	0.493	0.096	0.002
	(-2.37)	(-0.44)	-3.26	-1.76	-0.71	-0.01
<40	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
40-60	-0.744***	-0.574***	0.579	0.429	0.645***	0.582***
	(-5.15)	(-3.75)	-1.9	-1.37	-4.17	-3.57
>60	-1.265***	-0.887***	0.012	-0.324	1.230***	1.054***
	(-9.07)	(-5.90)	-0.04	(-1.02)	-8.3	-6.57
female	.	.	.	.	.	.
	.	.	.	.	.	.
male	-0.014	0.16	0.583**	0.458*	-0.093	-0.229*
	(-0.14)	-1.53	-2.82	-2.12	(-0.96)	(-2.17)
CECT	0.511***	0.314	0.124	0.308	-0.550***	-0.330*
	-3.37	-1.93	-0.39	-0.93	(-3.56)	(-2.00)
ID migration background		0.085***		-0.115**		-0.083***
		-3.94		(-2.64)		(-3.81)

ID culturally interested		0.117***				
		-4.5				
ID feminists		0.162***		-0.131**		-0.152***
		-7.73		(-2.95)		(-7.14)
ID nationals		-0.129***		0.064		0.108***
		(-4.94)		-1.26		-4.07
ID christian western values		-0.091***				0.059**
		(-4.52)				-2.97
ID rural		-0.084***		0.055		
		(-3.57)		-1.24		
ID hard working				0.099*		
				-2.15		
ID cosmopolitan				-0.161**		
				(-3.29)		
ID wealthy						0.163***
						-7.09
ID humble means						-0.070**
						(-2.88)
cst	0.835***	0.683*	-3.394***	-2.975***	-1.081***	-1.184***
	-4.11	-2.09	(-7.76)	(-4.31)	(-5.10)	(-3.30)
R2	0.057	0.133	0.053	0.115	0.048	0.114
BIC	3026.477	2772.007	1039.727	1019.466	2955.541	2731.83
N	2230	2177	2230	2175	2230	2175

Table A4.5: Socio-structural factors and key in- and outgroups as determinants of vote choice (England)

Closeness of party block voters to the 17 group identities

While Chapter 4 displayed the closeness of the voters of the three party blocks to select identities, we report the full results for all 17 group identities here, by country.

Figure A4.2: Identity divergence between supporters of party blocs, all 17 group identities, results for France

|			
4.94 5.94 6.94	6.48 7.48 8.48	4.17 5.17 6.17	3.74 4.74 5.74
id_c_highed	id_c_meded	id_c_lowed	id_c_wealthy
5.69 6.69 7.69	5.93 6.93 7.93	5.74 6.74 7.74	5.35 6.35 7.35
id_c_humblem	id_c_hardw	id_c_creativew	id_c_socedu
5.82 6.82 7.82	4.88 5.88 6.88	3.57 4.57 5.57	6.61 7.61 8.61
id_c_rural	id_c_urban	id_c_fem	id_c_nat
4.28 5.28 6.28	5.35 6.35 7.35	5.78 6.78 7.78	6.29 7.29 8.29
id_c_migration	id_c_cos	id_c_cult	id_c_downte
3.79 4.79 5.79			
id_c_christ			

□ left   ▨ right   ■ far right

Figure A4.3: Identity divergence between supporters of party blocs, all 17 group identities, results for Switzerland

Figure A4.4: Identity divergence between supporters of party blocs, all 17 group identities, results for Germany

5.11 6.11 7.11	5.41 6.41 7.41	4.13 5.13 6.13	3.23 4.23 5.23
id_c_highed	id_c_meded	id_c_lowed	id_c_wealthy
5.46 6.46 7.46	5.69 6.69 7.69	5.13 6.13 7.13	4.99 5.99 6.99
id_c_humblem	id_c_hardw	id_c_creativew	id_c_socedu
4.92 5.92 6.92	5.21 6.21 7.21	3.73 4.73 5.73	6.44 7.44 8.44
id_c_rural	id_c_urban	id_c_fem	id_c_nat
3.93 4.93 5.93	3.86 4.86 5.86	5.48 6.48 7.48	6.5 7.5 8.5
id_c_migration	id_c_cos	id_c_cult	id_c_downte
4.79 5.79 6.79			
id_c_christ			

□ left   ▨ right   ■ far right

Figure A4.5: Identity divergence between supporters of party blocs, all 17 group identities, results for England

Role of own identification for perception of identity party link

Comparing low and high identifiers

Figure A5.1: Perception of Group-Party Associations, Migration Background, for those with above and below median identification

Comparing low and high identifiers

Germany

Switzerland

(bar chart, Rural)

Legend: ID < 7 | ID > 7

Figure A5.2: Perception of Group-Party Associations, Rural, for those with above and below median identification

Comparing low and high identifiers

Germany

Switzerland

(bar chart, Cosmopolitan)

Legend: ID < 6 | ID > 6

Figure A5.3: Perception of Group-Party Associations, Cosmopolitan, for those with above and below median identification

Comparing low and high identifiers

Figure A5.4: Perception of Group-Party Associations, Co-Nationals, for those with above and below median identification

Comparing low and high identifiers

Figure A5.5: Perception of Group-Party Associations, Hard Work, for those with above and below median identification

Comparing low and high identifiers

Figure A5.6: Perception of Group-Party Associations, Down to Earth, for those with above and below median identification

Figure A5.7: Perception of Group-Party Associations, Universalistic Identities, France and England

Figure A5.8: Perception of Group-Party Associations, Particularistic Identities, France and England


Figure A5.9: Perception of Group-Party Associations, Contested Identities, France and England

Figure A5.10: Perception of Group-Party Associations for Migration Background, two Age Groups


Figure A5.11: Perception of Group-Party Associations for Down to Earth, two Age Groups