Brexitland: Online Appendix

# Chapter 3

## Page 60, footnote 3

**Table A3.1 – Stability of ethnocentric attitudes within cohorts over time**

**(i) Being born in Britain is important to being British**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1995** | **2003** | **2013** |
| WWII & post-WWII (born 1927-1945) | 60 | 60 | 61 |
| Wilson-Heath (born 1946-1960) | 43 | 41 | 44 |
| Thatcher-Major (born 1961-1976) | 37 | 38 | 35 |
| Blair-Brown (born after 1976)  | n/a | 33 | 27 |

Source: British Social Attitudes surveys

**(ii) Would mind if a close relative married someone black**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **1986** | **1996** | **2013** |
| Interwar (pre 1927)  | 63 | 56 | n/a |
| WWII & post-WWII (born 1927-1945) | 59 | 47 | 46 |
| Wilson-Heath (born 1946-1960) | 43 | 31 | 21 |
| Thatcher-Major (born 1961-1976) | 24 | 19 | 17 |
| Blair-Brown (born after 1976)  |  |  | 17 |

Source: British Social Attitudes surveys

Table A3.1 illustrates the stability of within cohort ethnocentric attitudes, and of differences between cohorts over time. Views about the importance of native birth as a marker of national identity do not change at all over two decades in each of the three cohorts examined, or over a decade among the youngest cohort. Opposition to inter-racial marriage shows more movement within cohorts, in particular a notable across the board decline in 1986-1996. However, the larger differences are between cohorts, and these remain stable over time.

## Page 61, footnote 4

**Table A3.2 –** **Opposition to a close relative marrying someone from various different groups among white graduates and white school leavers in 2013**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Share of white graduates opposed** | **Share of white school leavers opposed** |
| Muslim | 27 | 57 |
| West Indian | 9 | 32 |
| Asian | 7 | 29 |
| Black | 9 | 24 |
| Eastern European | 5 | 24 |

Source: British Social Attitudes survey, 2013

There is a substantial minority of low qualification whites who reject ethnocentric conceptions of the nation, and a substantial minority of graduates and ethnic minorities who express at least some support for them. The same patterns obtain for hostility to minority and migrant out-groups.

**Figure A3.1 Opposition to a close relative marrying someone from various different groups among ethnic minorities 2010**

Source EMBES 2010

## Page 69, footnote 9

Although white people are less supportive of all minority rights, the gradient of support among white people and non-white minorities is the same. The least intensive rights, such as keeping one’s own traditions and customs, receives the largest support and government increasing opportunities for minorities less support from most ethnic groups (apart from the two Black minorities who support this more than keeping customs and traditions). Finally, the strongest policy option of giving minorities priority for jobs to compensate them for prejudice, akin to US style affirmative action, receives the least support from most ethnic groups, including near zero from white Britons.

**Figure A3.2 Support for racial equality policies among white and ethnic minority Britons, 2010 (percentages).**

Source EMBES 2010 and BES 2010

## Page 82, footnote 41

Table A3.4 uses results from a randomised survey experiment to illustrate the greater responsiveness of those expressing a high motivation to control prejudice to a survey treatment dismissing support for diversity as an expression of political correctness. Those who score low on motivation to control prejudice express neutral or negative views about the impact of diversity on London regardless of treatment condition, while those who score high on MCP express positive views of diversity in the baseline condition, but express greater ambivalence or negativity when exposed to the “political correctness” statement.

**Table A3.4 Share expressing neutral or negative views of the impact of diversity on London in different experimental treatment conditions, by motivation to control prejudice level (percentages)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Experimental treatment** | **Low MCP** | **High MCP** |
| No primes | 72 | 30 |
| Diversity prime only | 80 | 43 |
| Political correctness prime only | 72 | 43 |
| Diversity and political correctness primes | 80 | 50 |
| *Difference PC prime vs baseline* | *0* | *13* |
| *Difference PC & diversity prime vs baseline* | *8* | *20* |
|  |  |  |

Source: YouGov, 2015

# Chapter 4

## Page 112, fig 4.6, footnote 50

**Table A4.1 Attitudes to race and immigration and identification with the Conservative and Labour parties 1983-1996**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Self-rated prejudice** | **Social distance** | **Reduce black/Asian immigration[[1]](#footnote-1)** | **Attitudes to immigrants scales[[2]](#footnote-2)** |
|  *Conservative models* |  |  |  |  |
| 1983 | **0.66\*\*\*** | **0.20\*\*\*** | **0.47\*\*\*** | **0.14\*\*\*** |
| 1984  | **0.31\*\*** | **0.19\*\*\*** | **0.55\*\*\*** | - |
| 1986  | **0.58\*\*\*** | **0.29\*\*\*** | **0.61\*\*\*** | - |
| 1989 | **0.72\*\*\*** | **0.24\*\*\*** | **0.43\*\*** | **0.22\*\*\*** |
| 1990 | **0.66\*\*\*** | - | **0.64\*\*\*** | - |
| 1991 | **0.41\*\*** | **0.21\*\*\*** | - | - |
| 1994  | **0.57\*\*\*** | **0.12\*\*** | **0.74\*\*\*** | - |
| 1995 | - | - | **0.26+** | **0.07\*\*** |
| 1996 | **0.50\*\*\*** | **0.17\*\*\*** | **0.55\*\*\*** | - |
|  *Labour* *Models* |  |  |  |  |
| 1983 | **-0.42\*\*\*** | **-0.08+** | **-0.42\*\*\*** | -0.06 |
| 1984 | **-0.34\*\*** | **-0.10\*** | **-0.36\*** | - |
| 1986 | **-0.28\*\*\*** | **-0.14\*\*** | **-0.36\*** | - |
| 1989 | **-0.66\*\*\*** | **-0.16\*\*** | **-0.50\*\*\*** | **-0.18\*\*\*** |
| 1990 | **-0.47\*\*\*** | - | **-0.51\*\*\*** | - |
| 1991 | **-0.36\*\*** | **-0.14\*** | - | - |
| 1994 | **-0.41\*\*\*** | **-0.11\*** | **-0.53\*\*\*** |  |
| 1995 | - | - | **-0.45\*\*\*** | **-0.08\*\*\*** |
| 1996 | **-0.34\*\*\*** | **-0.10\*** | **-0.44\*\*\*** |  |

Significant results in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Source: British Social Attitudes surveys 1983-1996. The reported figures are regression coefficients from logistic regression models including controls for gender, age, social class, region, religion, education and housing.

Table A4.1 illustrates the power of four different measures of hostility to outgroups as predictors of Conservative and Labour partisan identity during the period 1983-1996. In nearly every case, hostility to outgroups is a positive predictor of Conservative partisan identity and a negative predictor of Labour partisan identity.

# Chapter 5

## P 139, footnote 43

As table A5.1 illustrates, identity conservatives interviewed in the New Labour years expressed lower trust in government and MPs than other voters; were less happy with how British democracy operates; and were more sceptical about democracy in general.

**Table A5.1 Levels of political distrust and disaffection among graduates and ethnic minorities and white voters with low qualifications interviewed in the New Labour years**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Item** | **Agreement, graduates and ethnic minorities** | **Agreement, white school leavers** |
|  |  |  |
| People like me have no say in government  | 47 | 67 |
| MPs soon lose touch with people  | 62 | 78 |
| Parties are only interested in votes  | 62 | 76 |
| Almost never trust government  | 20 | 29 |
| Almost never trust MPs to tell the truth  | 44 | 57 |
| Doesn’t matter who is in power  | 48 | 74 |
| Voting is only way people like me have a say | 50 | 68 |

Source BES face to face survey, 2005

## Page 141, footnote 44

**Table A5.2 Levels of political disaffection among graduates and ethnic minorities and white voters with low qualifications interviewed in the New Labour years**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Don't care who won | Negative feelings about both Labour and Conservatives |
|  | White low qualifications  | Graduates and ethnic minorities  | White low qualifications  | Graduates and ethnic minorities |
| 1997 | 26.9 | 18.1 | 1.6 | 2.6 |
| 2001 | 18.2 | 18.5 | 11.8 | 13.6 |
| 2005 | 30.5 | 22.5 | 14.2 | 12.9 |
| 2010 | 30.3 | 20.1 | 15.5 | 9.3 |

Source: British Election Studies, 1997–2010.

The attitudes of political disaffection got progressively worse between 1997 and 2010 for all social groups, but white low qualification Britons have seen a larger increase in disaffection. As Table A 5.2 illustrates, the share of white low qualifications voters who did not care who won the election, and had negative feelings towards both parties increased more over the 2000s and was considerably higher in 2010 than the equivalent shares among graduates and ethnic minorities.

## Page 149 footnote 63

While overall attitudes were stable in the second wave, these averages mask deep and persistent divides within the electorate. Concern about immigration in the New Labour years was heavily concentrated among ethnocentric identity conservative voters, and opposition to immigration was already closely associated with other aspects of identity politics which would become mobilised in the next decade: assertive English national identity and Euroscepticism.

**Table A5.3 Views of immigration and prevalence of ethnocentric/Eurosceptic attitudes among identity conservatives (percentages agree)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Share of most anti-immigrant voters who agree | Share of least anti-immigrant voters who agree |
| 2003 |  |  |
| Non-white person cannot be truly English/Welsh/Scottish | 19 | 6 |
| Born in UK very important to being British | 63 | 6 |
| Having British ancestry very important | 46 | 29 |
| Feels very close to Europe | 2 | 13 |
| 2008 |  |  |
| Non-white person born in England not English | 21 | 11 |
| Leave the EU | 32 | 17 |

Source: British Social Attitudes 2003; 2008

## Page 152, figure 5.11

**Table A5.4 Regression models of sentiment towards immigrants on voter ratings of Labour issue performance in 2005 (regression coefficients, standard errors in brackets)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Issue | Asylum | Crime | Health service | Terrorism | Economy | Taxation |
| Intercept | **0.59 (0.02)\*** | **0.57 (0.02)\*** | **0.60 (0.02)\*** | **0.65** **(0.01)\*** | **0.80** **(0.01)\*** | **0.60** **(0.01)\*** |
| Anti-immigrant sentiment (0-1 scale) | **-0.57 (0.02)\*** | **-0.26 (0.03)\*** | **-0.21 (0.03)\*** | **-0.15 (0.03)\*** | **-0.27 (0.02)\*** | **-0.24 (0.02)\*** |
| *R squared* | 0.25 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.04 |
| *N* | 3783 | 3805 | 3814 | 3753 | 3764 | 3705 |

Source: 2005 British Election Study face to face survey; significant effects in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A5.4 illustrates the unique power of anti-immigrant sentiment on ratings of asylum issue performance, and the strong relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and views of the Labour party and its leaders in the 2001, 2005 and 2010 elections.

## Page 153, footnote 64

Table A5.5 illustrates the reactivation of the identity politics alignment in the 2000s, with anti-immigrant voters expressing much more negative views of the Labour party and its leaders in each of the elections held from 2001 to 2010.

**Table A5.5: Regression models of sentiment towards immigrants on views of Labour party and Labour Prime Ministers 2001-2010**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Views of Labour party | Views of Labour Prime Minister |
|  | 2001 | 2005 | 2010 | 2001 | 2005 | 2010 |
| Intercept | **6.82 (0.20)\*** | **6.16****(0.14)\*** | **6.41** **(0.15)\*** | **6.55 (0.20)\*** | **5.50** **(0.15)\*** | **5.99** **(0.15)\*** |
| Anti-immigrant sentiment (0-1 scale) | **-2.45 (0.39)\*** | **-1.95 (0.26)\*** | **-3.21 (0.28)\*** | **-1.89 (0.38)\*** | **-1.13 (0.28)\*** | **-3.15 (0.27)\*** |
| *R squared* | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.07 |
| *N* | 1952 | 3809 | 3008 | 1965 | 3810 | 3010 |

 Source: British Election Study face to face surveys; significant effects in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

# Chapter 6

## Page 177, footnote 50; page 181, footnote 56

**Table A6.1a Regression coefficients of two models of general election vote intention for UKIP in 2014.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Demographics only** | **Demographics and attitudes** |
| No qualifications | ref | ref |
| Below GCSE | **-.3\*\*** | -.25 |
| GCSE | **-.28\*\*** | -.01 |
| A-level | **-.53\*\*\*** | -.05 |
| UG degree | **-.99\*\*\*** | -.19 |
| PG degree | **-1.28\*\*\*** | -.07 |
| White  | ref | ref |
| Ethnic minority | **-.59\*\*** | -.14 |
| Female  | ref | ref |
| Male | **.26\*\*** | **.23\*\*\*** |
| Born before 1946 | ref | ref |
| Born 1946-1960 | .10 | .16 |
| Born 1961-1976 | -.08 | **.27\*** |
| Born 1977-1991 | **-.38\*\*\*** | **.30\*** |
| Born 1992 onwards | **-.83\*\*\*** | .30 |
| EU attitudes |  | **.16\*\*\*** |
| English identity |  | **.04\*** |
| Brit identity |  | -.00 |
| Immigration good for economy |  | **-.55\*\*\*** |
| Immigration good for culture |  | **-.97\*\*\*** |
| Immigration most important issue |  | **.66\*\*\*** |
| Change in immigration attitudes |  | **.16\*\*** |
| Equal opportunities for BAME gone too far |  | **.33\*\*\*** |
| Authoritarianism |  | **.06\*** |
| Left- right |  | **-.06\*\*** |
| Economic perceptions |  | **-.11\*** |
| Cuts gone too far national |  | -.009 |
| Cuts too far local |  | -.03 |
| Change in economic perceptions |  | .04 |
| Change NHS |  | **.06\*\*\*** |
| Change crime |  | .05 |
| *N* | 18,181 | 11,177 |
| *R squared* | .04 | .21 |

Source British Election Internet Panel 2014; significant effects in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

Table A6.1 presents full regression models of UKIP vote intention, first with just demographics and then with attitudes included as predictors. In the first model, all the indicators of identity conservatism, such as being of an older generation, being white and having low education levels are strong predictors of intending to vote for UKIP. As we expect from the relationship between these indicators and ethnocentrism discussed in Chapter 3, when ethnocentric attitudes are introduced most demographic predictors become statistically insignificant, because they are highly corelated with ethnocentric attitudes.

## page 178, footnote 52; Page 179, figure 6.7

Table A6.2 shows the predicted probabilities of switching from different 2010 election choices to UKIP in 2014, based on the identity conservatism score, which was calculated on the basis of the regression models in Table A6.3. Ethnocentric attitudes in these regressions form the basis of the identity conservatism score used.

**Table A6.2 Predicted probability of switching to UKIP among 2010 Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat supporters and 2010 abstainers, by levels of identity conservatism.**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predicted rate of switching to UKIP | 2010 Con | 2010 Lab | 2010 LD | 2010 Abstained |
| Identity liberal | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| 0.25 | 0.015 | 0.012 | 0.009 | 0.012 |
| 0.5 | 0.044 | 0.041 | 0.039 | 0.038 |
| 0.75 | 0.122 | 0.124 | 0.151 | 0.116 |
| Identity conservative | 0.295 | 0.323 | 0.433 | 0.306 |

Source: Source British Election Internet Panel 2014

As Table A6.3 shows, attitudes towards equal opportunities for non-white minorities, cultural threat response to immigration and assertive English nationalism are the ethnocentric attitudes particularly strongly predictive of switching to UKIP in 2014.

Political dissatisfaction is only a significant predictor of switching from Conservatives to UKIP.

**Table A6.3 Regression coefficients for switching to UKIP at European Parliament elections for in 2014.**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2010 Conservative voters** | **2010 Labour voters** | **2010 Liberal Democrat voters** |
|  |  |  |  |
| Economic perceptions | 0.10 | 0.10 | **0.68\*\*** |
| Immigration bad for economy | -0.07 | 0.02 | -0.11 |
| Immigration bad for culture | **-0.16\*\*\*** | **-0.36\*\*\*** | **-0.51\*** |
| Politicians do not care what ppl like me think | **0.18\*\*** | 0.04 | -0.10 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | -0.13 | -0.13 | -0.45 |
| England is getting a fair deal | **-0.24\*\*** | 0.03 | -0.07 |
| English only MPs making decisions about England | **0.32\*** | 0.15 | 0.42 |
| English parliament support | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.82 |
| Equal opportunities for BAME gone too far | **0.30\*\*\*** | **0.43\*\*\*** | -0.02 |
| Authoritarian-libertarian scale | 0.06 | 0.11 | 0.02 |
| *R squared* | *.08* | *.13* | *.25* |
| *N* | *3,137* | *3017* | *585* |

Source British Election Internet Panel 2014; significant effects in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

# Chapter 7

##  P 193, footnote 9

Although the overall Labour ratings on most issues of the day were fairly negative, immigration was their worst issue, overshadowing even the issue of financial crisis, which had started when Labour was in government. Despite efforts to appear strong on immigration control throughout Ed Miliband’s leadership, following the 2010 election loss, there is very little improvement in Labour ratings on this issue.

**Table A7.1 Labour Issue Ratings 2011-13**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Issue | Asylum | Crime | Health service | Terrorism | Financial crisis | Education |
| Rating 2011 | -49 | -21 | -2 | -9 | -30 | -12 |
| Rating 2012 | -46 | -20 | +3 | -8 | -31 | -10 |
| Rating 2013 | -45 | -16 | -1 | -6 | -32 | -11 |

Source: British Election Study Continuous Monitoring Survey 2011-13, scores are net (share saying Labour would handle the issue “well” or “very well” – share saying Labour would handle the issue “badly” or “very badly”)

## P193, footnote 12

Figures A7.2-A7.4 show that similarly to those who were against the policy of austerity, people with negative views of the economy, NHS, and those more economically insecure were all more likely to defect to UKIP after the 2010 election, than to the traditional opposition alternative: Labour.

**Fig A7.2 2014 vote preferences of 2010 Conservative voters, by views of the economy**

**Fig A7.3 2014 vote preferences of 2010 Conservative voters, by views of the NHS**

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2014

**Fig A7.4 2014 vote preferences of 2010 Conservative voters, by economic insecurity**

Source: British Election Study internet panel, 2014

## Page 196, footnote 17

As the figure A7.5 shows, 2010 Labour supporters with the most identity conservative attitudes towards equal opportunities for non-white minorities were most likely to switch to UKIP over the course of the Coalition. 2010 voters who felt equal opportunity polices have gone too far were less likely in 2014 to want to vote for Labour again, but they were switching mostly to UKIP, as switching to the Conservatives did not show any relationship with this attitude.

**Figure A7.5 2014 vote preferences of 2010 Labour voters, by attitudes to race equality policies**

Source: British Election Study internet panel, 2014–18.

This pattern was also visible to a slightly smaller degree by the sense of Englishness that 2010 Labour voters professed, although Labour 2010 voters who felt very strongly English were also likely to switch to Conservatives, as well as UKIP, but this relationship is weaker for Conservative switching than it is for switching to UKIP.

**Figure A7.6 2014 vote preferences of 2010 Labour voters, by feeling of Englishness**

Source: British Election Study internet panel, 2014–18.

## P205 footnote 39

By the time the EU Referendum got underway a majority of Labour voters were supportive of equal opportunity policies for ethnic minorities, and soon after the 2016 EU referendum they also became majority pro-European integration, as figure A.7.7 and A 7.8 illustrate.

**Figure A7.7 Views of European integration among Labour voters, 2005–16**

Source: British Election Study internet panel, 2014–18.

**Figure A7.8 Views of equal opportunity policies for Black and Asian Britons among Labour voters, 2005–16**

Source: British Election Study internet panel, 2014–18.

## Page 211, footnote 45

Voters that Labour won over from the Liberal Democrats in 2015 retained not only a much more positive view of the Liberal Democrat Party, but they also declared a higher propensity to vote for the Green Party at some future election, making them effectively floating voters.

**Figure A7.9 Probability of ever voting for the Green Party among different groups of Labour 2015 voters, 2014–17**

**Source: British Election Study internet panel, 2014–18. Voters rate their probability of ever voting for parties on a 0–10 scale.**

# Chapter 8

## Page 232, footnote 34, figure 8.4; and page 233, figure 8.5

Table A8.1 shows full regression models of having chosen Conservatives versus Labour in 2015 elections and Leave versus Remain in 2016 referendum. The first models for each are demographic only, while the second models add attitudinal predictors.

Economic perceptions that were a strong and significant predictor of having voted for Conservatives over Labour in 2015 did not matter in 2016 referendum; and the effects of attitudes about the economic and cultural attitudes to immigration were stronger in the EU Referendum model than in the 2015 Conservatives versus Labour model. In the 2015 model economic impacts on immigration is not a significant predictor.

**Table A8.1 Full regression models for choosing Con over Lab in 2015 GE and Leave over Remain In 2016 EU membership referendum (unstandardized coefficients).**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2015 Con-Lab | 2016 Leave-Remain |
|  | demographics | demographics and attitudes  | demographics | demographics and attitudes |
| Social class# |  |  |  |  |
| AB | ref | ref | ref | ref |
| C1  | **-0.11\*** | 0.04 | 0.99 | 0.04  |
| C2 | **-0.25\*\*** | 0.02 | **1.48\*\*\*** | **0.27\***  |
| DE | **-0.47\*\*\*** | -0.22 | **1.26\*\*\*** | 0.16  |
| Household income  |  |  |  |  |
| Under £15K | ref | ref | ref | ref |
| £15-30K | **0.36\*\*\*** | 0.15 | **1.21\*** | **0.27\***  |
| £30-45K | **0.60\*\*\*** | -0.01 | **1.26\*\*\*** | **0.33\*\***  |
| Over £45K | **1.05\*\*\*** | **0.41\*** | **1.19\*\*** | **0.21\***  |
| Don't know | **0.83\*\*\*** | **0.58\*\*** | **1.39\*\*\*** | **0.21\***  |
| Education level |  |  |  |  |
| University degree | Ref | ref | ref | ref |
| GCSE and below | **0.15\*** | 0.16 | **2.68\*\*\*** | **0.42\*\*\*** |
| A-level | **0.19\*\*** | -0.008 | **1.67\*\*\*** | **0.19\***  |
| White | ref | ref | ref | ref |
| Ethnic Minority | **-0.75\*\*\*** | -0.25 | **1.88\*\*\*** | 0.09 |
| Generations |  |  |  |  |
| Born before 1928 | ref | ref | ref | ref |
| Born 1928-1945 | -0.78 | 0.57 | 0.25 | -0.27 |
| Born 1946-1960 | -1.09 | -0.2 | 1.00 | 0.04 |
| Born 1961-1976 | -1.51 | **-0.51\*\*\*** | 0.97 | 0.07  |
| Born 1977-1991 | -1.49 | **-0.55\*\*** | **0.74\*\*\*** | 0.12 |
| Born 1992 onwards | -1.41 | -0.45 | **0.33\*\*\*** | -0.34 |
| Female | ref | ref | ref |  |
| Male | 0.01 | 0.12 | 1.03 | **0.26\*\*\*** |
| Insecurity |  | 0.01 |  | 0.009 |
| Economic perceptions |  | **1.19\*\*\*** |  | 0.07 |
| Authoritarianism |  | **0.26\*\*\*** |  | **0.18\*\*\*** |
| Left- right |  | **0.59\*\*\*** |  | **0.15\*\*\*** |
| Very satisfied with UK democracy |  | ref |  | ref |
| Not at all satisfied |  | 0.19 |  | **0.42\***  |
| Fairly dissatisfied |  | -0.35 |  | 0.24 |
| Fairly satisfied |  | -0.1 |  | -0.1 |
| Politicians don’t care what people like me think |  | **-0.76\*\*\*** |  | **0.98\*\*\*** |
| English identity |  | **0.81\*\*\*** |  | **0.63\*\*\*** |
| Equal opportunities for BAME went too far |  | **0.34\*\*\*** |  | **0.20\*\*\*** |
| Immigrants good for culture |  | **-0.83\*\*\*** |  | **-1.85\*\*\*** |
| Immigrants good for economy |  | -0.48 |  | **-2.0\*\*\*** |
| *N* | *10,835* | *7608* | *20,613* | *11176* |
| *R2* | *.04* | *.45* | *.08* | *.32* |

Source British Election Internet Panel 2014; significant effects in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

#AB Higher & intermediate managerial, administrative, professional occupations

C1 Supervisory, clerical & junior managerial, administrative, professional occupations

C2 Skilled manual occupations

DE Semi-skilled & unskilled manual occupations, Unemployed and lowest grade occupations

## Page 242, footnote 47 (figure 8.8)

Table 8.2 shows how Leavers and Remainers perceived each other and their own Brexit camp. Generally, Leavers scored fellow Leavers more highly on positive attributes such as being Reasonable and Patriotic, and Remainers higher on negative attributes such as intolerant and selfish. This was largely true the other way around with Remainers thinking fellow Remainers were more positive and Leavers more negative. The only exception was that Remainers were less likely to draw a clear difference between the two groups on patriotism, perhaps because for Remain supporters this is not such a straightforwardly positive characteristic.

**Table 8.2 Percent of respondents identifying Leave and Remain voters with positive and negative characteristics, by their own Brexit vote (%).**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Intolerant | Selfish | Reasonable | Patriotic | Don't know |
| Leave voters are… | Leavers' perceptions | 10 | 4 | 52 | 61 | 15 |
| Remainers' perceptions | 30 | 37 | 9 | 7 | 23 |
| Remain voters are… | Leavers' perceptions | 62 | 50 | 6 | 21 | 15 |
| Remainers' perceptions | 6 | 4 | 64 | 20 | 16 |

Source: YouGov 2019

## Page 244 footnote 49, figure 8.9

Each respondent was asked the following survey question three times, so saw three pairs of families altogether.

The survey question was:

Please read the descriptions of these two families and imagine both of them were to move to a house on your street. How would you feel about this and, if you had a say, which one would you prefer to move into your neighbourhood?

Q10. If you had to choose, which one would you rather see move in?

Q11. How would you feel about Family 1 moving in (scale 0-7)

Q12. How would you feel about Family 2 moving in (scale 0-7)

The information about the two families was presented in the following format, with one characteristic randomly selected per table cell (these randomisations were conducted before the survey was fielded and completely identical families were excluded).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Family 1 | Family 2 |
| Working | Both full time/Only dad is working/both part time/unemployed | Both full time/Only dad is working/both part time/unemployed |
| Jobs | Teacher/architect/builder (has to be two each for option 1 and 2) | Teacher/architect/builder (has to be two each for option 1 and 2) |
| Number of children | 2/4 | 2/4 |
| Social life | members of a local wine club/regulars at the local Wetherspoons pub/ enjoy running/ on a local pub darts team/ keep themselves to themselves | members of a local wine club/regulars at the local Wetherspoons pub/ enjoy running/ on a local pub darts team/ keep themselves to themselves |
| In their window they display | An English flag/ a “refugees welcome” sign/ a “no junk mail” sign | An English flag/ a “refugees welcome” sign/ a “no junk mail” sign |
| Party voted for | Conservatives; Labour; Liberal Democrats; UKIP; did not vote | Conservatives; Labour; Liberal Democrats; UKIP; did not vote |
| EU Referendum voted for | Remain; Leave | Remain; Leave |
| They come from | has lived in the local area their whole life; moved to the area from elsewhere in Britain 10 years ago; moved to the area from Poland 10 years ago; moved to the area from France 10 years ago; moved to the area from Pakistan 10 years ago moved to the UK from Slovakia 10 years ago | has lived in the local area their whole life; moved to the area from elsewhere in Britain 10 years ago; moved to the area from Poland 10 years ago; moved to the area from France 10 years ago; moved to the area from Pakistan 10 years ago moved to the UK from Slovakia 10 years ago |
| their dream holiday is | caravan holidays in Britain, all-inclusive holidays in Benidorm, caravan holidays in the South of France, all-inclusive holidays in the Caribbean | caravan holidays in Britain, all-inclusive holidays in Benidorm, caravan holidays in the South of France, all-inclusive holidays in the Caribbean |

Analysis:

As a first step of analysis we reshape the data to increase the number of observations to three per respondent per question, and thus to increase statistical power. Since such data reshaping produces clustering across respondents, we account in our analysis for the possibility that the results may be correlated across respondents. We then estimate the average marginal components effects (AMCEs) of the different attributes in a given vignette via a linear probability model where the dependent variable is whether the family was seen as preferred or not (0= not preferred, 1= preferred) for the first of the questions and the profile ranking (0-10) for the next two questions; and the independent variables are the attributes in the shown family profiles in dummy variable format, in order to estimate the relative importance of the various attributes. The AMCEs produced with this method represent the “average change in the probability that a profile will win support when it includes the listed attribute values instead of the baseline” (Hainmueller et al., 2014, p. 19) and thus show which attributes of the profile lead respondents to choose who is the preferred family in the first question and ranked a family higher in the next two questions. Respondent characteristics, like their 2016 referendum vote, are also included as independent variables in the models.

The analysis presented in the book is limited to the discreet choice between the two families question (Q11).

## Page 245, footnote 50, figure 8.10

We calculated the difference between propensity to vote for each Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats between wave 6 (before EU referendum) and wave 9 (after referendum) of British Election Study Internet Panel. These are the differences by strength of Brexit identity as either Remainer or Leaver.

**Figure A8.1 Change in propensity to vote (PTV) for Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats between spring 2016 (pre-EU Referendum) and spring 2017 by strength of Leave or Remain identity, England and Wales**

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel 2014-2019

#

# Chapter 9

## Page 259 footnote 11 fig 9.2

The strength of Scottish attachment to a broader British identity is also clear in ‘Moreno’ survey question which asks Scots to express the relative strength of their dual Scottish and British identities. Only around a quarter of Scots reject British identity outright, by saying that they do not identify as British at all, however the rest have at least some British identification, with about 40 percent saying they feel equally or more British than Scottish (see Figure A9.1).

**Fig A 9.1 Do you feel more Scottish than British? (%)**

Source SSA 2013

## Page 261, footnote 14

Figure A9.2 shows that while for the English voters there is no relationship between English identity and left-wing ideology, this relationship is present for Scottish voters. The Scots who feel more Scottish than English are significantly more likely to also subscribe to more left-wing views than those Scots who have a British identity.

**Fig A9.2 Relationship between Scottish and British identity and left-right attitudes (English ID presented for comparison)**

## Page 265, footnote 20

Details of the links between ethnocentrism and support for Scottish independence pre-2014. Note, the overall levels of support for Independence were fairly low, around 30% for all groups, but the most ethnocentric group was significantly most supportive at 32% (chi-square statistic significant at Pr = 0.016 level).

Ethnocentrism measured by a scale of three items: Do you agree that more Muslims would mean Scotland would lose identity? Do you agree that more East Europeans would mean Scotland would lose identity? Do you agree that more Black and Asian would mean Scotland would lose identity?

**Fig A9.3 Pre-Indyref relationship between support for Independence and ethnocentrism in Scotland (%)**

Source Scottish Social Attitudes 2013

## Page 267, footnote 21

In tables A9.1-3 we present the detailed calculations for figure 9.5, which shows that while Brexit referendum campaign increased support for Brexit for those voters who were most authoritarian, right wing and ethnocentric, the Indyref campaign in Scotland managed to increase support for Scottish referendum more broadly.

**Table A9.1 Support for exit option before and after referendum campaign by ethnocentrism (%)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Support for Independence 2013 | Support for independence 2015 | Change |
| Most ethnocentric | 32 | 47 | 15 |
| 2 | 21 | 40 | 19 |
| 3 | 30 | 36 | 6 |
| Least ethnocentric | 28 | 41 | 13 |
|  | Support for Brexit 2015 | Support for Brexit 2017 |  |
| Most ethnocentric | 54 | 84 | 29 |
| 2 | 38 | 56 | 18 |
| 3 | 20 | 37 | 17 |
| Least ethnocentric | 14 | 15 | 1 |

Source: SSA 2013, 2015; BSA 2015, 2017

In Scotland, ethnocentrism measured by a scale of three items: Do you agree that more Muslims would mean Scotland would lose identity? Do you agree that more East Europeans would mean Scotland would lose identity? Do you agree that more Black and Asian would mean Scotland would lose identity?

In England, ethnocentrism measured by a single item: Does migration generally undermine or enrich British cultural life?

**Table A9.2 Support for exit option before and after referendum campaign by left wing ideology (%)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Support for Independence 2010 | Support for independence 2015 | Change |
| Most right wing | 8 | 25 | 17 |
| 2 | 12 | 31 | 19 |
| 3 | 19 | 37 | 18 |
| 4 | 28 | 43 | 15 |
| Most left wing | 39 | 50 | 11 |
|  | Support for Brexit 2013 | Support for Brexit 2017 |  |
| Most right wing | 18 | 40 | 22 |
| 2 | 22 | 39 | 17 |
| 3 | 27 | 37 | 10 |
| 4 | 32 | 35 | 3 |
| Most left wing | 38 | 34 | -4 |

Sources: British Social Attitudes, 2015 and 2017; Scottish Social Attitudes,

2013 and 2015

**Table A9.3 Support for exit option before and after referendum campaign by authoritarianism (%)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Support for Independence 2011 | Support for independence 2015 | Change |
| Least authoritarian | 26 | 57 | 31 |
| 2 | 25 | 51 | 26 |
| 3 | 24 | 45 | 21 |
| 4 | 23 | 40 | 17 |
| Most authoritarian | 23 | 34 | 11 |
|  | Support for Brexit 2013 | Support for Brexit 2017 |  |
| Least authoritarian | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| 2 | 7 | 9 | 2 |
| 3 | 16 | 24 | 8 |
| 4 | 34 | 49 | 15 |
| Most authoritarian  | 57 | 74 | 17 |

Sources: British Social Attitudes, 2013 and 2017; Scottish Social Attitudes, 2011 and 2015

## Page 268, footnote 22, figure 9.6

While both referendums’ exit campaigns succeeded in increasing support for separation, they could not alter the underlying patterns of voter attachment to the larger political unit. Expressions of British identity in Scotland, and European identity in England, were little different after the referendum than they were before.

**Figure A9.4 Scottish identity before and after the 2014 independence referendum (%)**

Source: SSA 2013, 2015

**Figure A9.5 European identity before and after the 2016 EU membership referendum (%)**

Source: BSA 2015, 2017

## Page 269, footnote 23

Figure 9.5 shows that the independence was overwhelmingly rejected by the many Scots who saw themselves as equally or more British than Scottish, and the ‘Yes’ campaign only won around half of those who said they were ‘more Scottish than British’. Only the minority of Scots who rejected British identity altogether – the ‘Scottish, not British’ – voted decisively for independence, and they were not numerous enough to deliver a victory for the ‘Yes’ campaign.

**Figure 9.5 Levels and change in support for independence 2010-2015 by level of Scottish identification (%)**

Source SSA 2010, 2015

## Page 275, footnote 39

Following the EU referendum in 2016, ethnocentric Scots had to choose who they opposed more: a rule of outsiders in Westminster, or rule of outsiders from Brussels. Many chose Brussels, and subsequently as we show in figure A9.6 support for independence fell by double digits among the most ethnocentric and Eurosceptic Scottish voters. In contrast, not facing such a dilemma, the more identity liberal Scots largely kept their original views of the EU.

**Figure A9.6 Support for Scottish independence before and after 2016 EU referendum, by ethnocentrism (top) and Euroscepticism (bottom). Percentages.**

# Chapter 10

## Page 290, footnote 8

Figure A10.1 shows that party switching in 2017 among Remain and Leave camps by strength of the Brexit identity. The Conservative party were particularly strongly affected, as on the whole all Leavers were the voters most likely to switch to Conservatives, although this effect grew in step with how strongly they identified as Leavers. Remainers were a little less eager to switch to Labour, but the stronger their identity the more likely they were to do so.

Leavers were also more likely to leave Labour when they felt strongly about their referendum choice, and so were the Remainers who were leaving Conservatives more if they were strongly self-invested in their new Remain identity.

**Figure A10.1 Strength of Brexit identity and party switching 2015-2017**

## Page 296, footnote 13, figure 10.3

Tables A10.1-A10.2 shows full regression models of switching between the political parties in 2015-17 and 2017-19 elections. Of particular interest are the identity politics values and attitudes, such as authoritarianism, English nationalism, views of equal opportunities and, particularly, views of immigration, which are in various combinations significant predictors of switching.

The first table shows models of switching from other parties either towards Labour or Conservatives, while the second table focuses on direct switching between the two main parties. The last two tables show models of propensity to vote for either Conservatives or Labour in the same time-frame, and further confirms the significance of the identity politics attitudes for the party choice over this period.

**Table A10.1 Regression models of switching to Conservatives and to Labour from all other parties 2015-17 and 2017-19, England and Wales (unstandardised coefficients)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2015 else to 2017 Con | 2017 else to 2019 Con | 2015 else to 2017 Lab | 2017 else to 2019 Lab |
| Intercept | -6.00 | -5.54 | -0.10 | 0.85 |
| Economic evaluations | **0.78\*\*\*** | **0.67\*\*\*** | **-0.60\*\*\*** | **-0.39\*\*\*** |
| Left-right ideology | **0.26\*\*\*** | **0.31\*\*\*** | **-0.22\*\*\*** | **-0.26\*\*\*** |
| Authoritarian-libertarian ideology | **0.27\*\*\*** | **0.26\*\*\*** | **-0.12\*\*\*** | **-0.18\*\*\*** |
| Least satisfied with democracy (ref: most satisfied)  | 0.09 | -0.73\* | **0.70\*** | -0.53 |
| Politicians don’t care about people like me | **-0.80\*\*\*** | 0.20 | **1.30\*\*\*** | 0.22 |
| English identity | **0.63\*\*\*** | **0.72\*\*** | -0.01 | **-0.58\*\*\*** |
| Immigration: cultural effects | **-1.96\*\*\*** | -0.37 | **1.23\*\*\*** | -0.01 |
| Immigration: economic effects | 0.15 | **-1.70\*\*\*** | -0.18 | **1.15\*** |
| Equal opportunities for ethnic minorities gone too far | **0.24\*\*\*** | **0.22\*\*** | **-0.17\*** | -0.21 |
| *N* | *3265* | *3210* | *3593* | *4010* |
| *R2* | *0.29* | *0.29* | *0.20* | *0.17* |

Source British Election Internet Panel 2014; significant effects in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

**Table A10.2 Regression models of direct vote switching Labour to Conservative and Conservative to Labour 2015-17 and 2017-19, England and Wales (unstandardised coefficients)**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2015 Lab to 2017 Con | 2017 Lab to 2019 Con | 2015 Con to 2017 Lab | 2017 Con to 2019 Lab |
| Intercept | -4.46 | -6.98 | -0.08 | 2.16 |
| Economic evaluations | **0.75\*\*\*** | **0.73\*\*\*** | **-0.84\*\*\*** | **-0.49\*\*\*** |
| Left-right ideology | 0.10 | **0.33\*\*\*** | **-0.24\*\*\*** | **-0.29\*\*\*** |
| Authoritarian-libertarian ideology | 0.13 | **0.37\*\*\*** | **-0.25\*\*\*** | **-0.35\*\*\*** |
| Least satisfied with democracy (ref: most satisfied)  | 0.04 | -0.69 | **1.28\*\*\*** | -0.50 |
| Politicians don’t care about people like me | -0.86 | 0.59 | **1.76\*\*\*** | 0.35 |
| English identity | 0.36 | **1.03\*\*\*** | -0.71 | **-1.47\*\*\*** |
| Immigration: cultural effects | **-1.73\*\*\*** | -0.12 | **1.85\*\*\*** | 0.82 |
| Immigration: economic effects | -0.01 | **-1.55\*\*** | 0.43 | **1.64\*\*\*** |
| Equal opportunities for ethnic minorities gone too far | 0.18 | **0.20\*** | -0.03 | -0.20 |
| *N* | *1556* | *1862* | *1918* | *2688* |
| *R2* | *0.18* | *0.30* | *0.24* | *0.19* |

Source British Election Internet Panel 2014; significant effects in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

**Table A10.3 Propensity to vote for Labour in 2015, 2017, and 2019 (0-10 scale)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Propensity to vote Labour 2015 | Propensity to vote Labour 2017 | Propensity to vote Labour 2019 |
| Intercept | **5.08\*\*\*** | **4.36\*\*\*** | **3.82\*\*\*** |
| Economic evaluations | **-1.09\*\*\*** | **-0.78\*\*\*** | **-0.51\*\*\*** |
| Left-right ideology | **-1.18\*\*\*** | **-1.04\*\*\*** | **-1.15\*\*\*** |
| Authoritarian-libertarian ideology | **-0.39\*\*\*** | **-0.45\*\*\*** | **-0.62\*\*\*** |
| Least satisfied with democracy (ref: most satisfied)  | **-1.62\*\*\*** | 0.27 | **-1.06\*\*\*** |
| Politicians don’t care about people like me | 0.05 | -0.02 | **-0.23\*\*\*** |
| English identity | -0.08 | -0.12 | **-0.10\*** |
| Immigration: cultural effects | **0.36\*\*\*** | **0.54\*\*\*** | **0.40\*\*\*** |
| Immigration: economic effects | **0.24\*** | **0.31\*\*\*** | **0.31\*\*\*** |
| Equal opportunities for ethnic minorities gone too far | **-0.32\*\*\*** | **-0.35\*\*\*** | **-0.33\*\*\*** |
| *N* | *6,664* | *9,697* | *11,543* |
| *R2* | *0.33* | *0.36* | *0.42* |

Source British Election Internet Panel 2014; significant effects in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

**Table A10.4 Propensity to vote for Conservatives in 2015, 2017, and 2019 (0-10 scale)**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Propensity to vote Conservative 2015 | Propensity to vote Conservative 2017 | Propensity to vote Conservative 2019 |
| Intercept | **4.41\*\*\*** | **5.66\*\*\*** | **5.00\*\*\*** |
| Economic evaluations | **1.39\*\*\*** | **0.92\*\*\*** | **0.98\*\*\*** |
| Left-right ideology | **1.17\*\*\*** | **0.95\*\*\*** | **1.17\*\*\*** |
| Authoritarian-libertarian ideology | **0.77\*\*\*** | **0.61\*\*\*** | **0.81\*\*\*** |
| Least satisfied with democracy (ref: most satisfied)  | **-0.67\*\*\*** | **-2.15\*\*\*** | -0.14 |
| Politicians don’t care about people like me | **-0.39\*\*\*** | **-0.49\*\*\*** | **-0.19\*\*\*** |
| English identity | **0.29\*\*\*** | **0.39\*\*\*** | **0.47\*\*\*** |
| Immigration: cultural effects | **-0.38\*\*\*** | **-0.51\*\*\*** | **-0.61\*\*\*** |
| Immigration: economic effects | **0.01** | **0.15\*\*** | 0.06 |
| Equal opportunities for ethnic minorities gone too far | **0.34\*\*\*** | **0.31\*\*\*** | **0.30\*\*\*** |
| *N* | *6668* | *9691* | *11,529* |
| *R2* | *0.45* | *0.44* | *0.48* |

Source British Election Internet Panel 2014; significant effects in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

## **Page 297, footnote 14**

**Table A10.5 Full regression models for choosing Con over Lab in 2015, 2017 and 2019 General Elections and Leave over Remain In 2016 EU membership referendum (unstandardized coefficients).**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2015 Con-Lab  | 2016 Leave-Remain | 2017 Con-Lab  | 2019 Con-Lab  |
| Social class |  |  |  |  |
| Intermediate occupations | ref | ref | ref | ref |
| Professionals and managers | 0.26 | 0.04  | 0.09 | .012 |
| Employers | 0.41 | **0.27\***  | **0.39\*\*** | .24 |
| Semi- routine and routine occupations | -0.18 | 0.16  | 0.02 | -.15 |
| Household income  |  |  |  |  |
| Under £15K | ref | ref | ref | ref |
| £15-30K | 0.17 | **0.27\***  | 0.00 | .05 |
| £30-45K | 0.14 | **0.33\*\***  | 0.24 | .10 |
| Over £45K | **0.49\*** | **0.21\***  | **0.37\*\*** | .21 |
| Don’t know | **0.64\*\*** | **0.21\***  | **0.50\*\*\*** | .24 |
| Level of education |  |  |  |  |
| GCSE and below | ref | ref | ref | ref |
| A-level | 0.11 | -12 | -0.01 | -.12 |
| University degree | -0.09 | **-20\*** | -0.05 | **-.28\*\*** |
| White | ref | ref | ref | ref |
| Ethnic minority | **-0.25\*** | 0.09 | -0.10 | **-.50\*\*** |
| Generations |  |  |  |  |
| Born before 1928 | ref | ref | ref | empty |
| Born 1928-1945 | 0.41 | -0.27 | -0.46 | ref |
| Born 1946-1960 | -0.16 | 0.04 | **-0.39\*\*** | **-0.46\*\*** |
| Born 1961-1976 | **-0.48** | 0.07  | **-0.97\*\*\*** | **-1.10\*\*\*** |
| Born 1977-1991 | **-0.39** | 0.12 | **-1.29\*\*\*** | **-1.46\*\*\*** |
| Born 1992 onwards | -0.21 | -0.34 | **-1.12\*\*** | **-1.80\*\*\*** |
| Female | ref | ref | ref | ref |
| Male | 0.04 | **0.26\*\*\*** | 0.13 | .085 |
| Economic perceptions | **1.17\*\*\*** | 0.07 | **0.82\*\*\*** | **0.99\*\*\*** |
| Authoritarianism | **0.28\*\*\*** | **0.18\*\*\*** | **0.24\*\*\*** | **0.37\*\*\*** |
| Left- right | **0.59\*\*\*** | **0.15\*\*\*** | **0.39\*\*\*** | **0.58\*\*\*** |
| Very satisfied with UK democracy |  | ref |  |  |
| Not at all satisfied | 0.05 | 0.42\*  | **-0.99\*\*\*** | 0.36 |
| Fairly dissatisfied | -0.35 | 0.24 | **-0.62\*\*\*** | -0.02 |
| Fairly satisfied | -0.11 | -0.1 | -0.08 | -0.00 |
| Politicians don’t care what people like me think | **-0.78\*\*\*** | **0.98\*\*\*** | **-1.14\*\*\*** | 0.11 |
| English identity | **0.86\*\*\*** | **0.63\*\*\*** | **0.62\*\*\*** | **0.98\*\*\*** |
| Equal opportunities for BAME went too far | **0.33\*\*\*** | **0.20\*\*\*** | **0.30\*\*\*** | **0.32\*\*\*** |
| Immigrants good for culture | **-0.92\*\*\*** | **-1.85\*\*\*** | **-1.16\*\*\*** | **-1.29\*\*\*** |
| Immigrants good for economy | -0.44 | **-2.0\*\*\*** | **-0.43\*** | **-1.15\*\*\*** |
| *N* | *7608* | *11176* | *7711* | *8661* |
| *R2* | *.45* | *.32* | *.39* | *.52* |

Source: BESIP 2014-2019; significant effects in bold: \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001

## Page 316, footnote 44

Percentage of British people spontaneously naming immigration as one of the three most important problems facing the country when asked by IPSOS-MORI, has fallen sharply straight after the June 2016 referendum and continued falling throughout the rest of the year. Since, it has plateaued at around 20 percent, again falling slightly in the more recent polls 2019, to an average of 15 per cent.

**Figure 10.2 Percentage of people naming immigration as the most important issue unprompted**

Source: IPSOS-MORI https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/issues-index-archive

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1. In 1995 and 2003, reduce immigration [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. In 1983 and 1989 this is a scale of attitudes about the children of immigrants. In 1995, it is a scale of attitudes to immigrants themselves [↑](#footnote-ref-2)